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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT  
Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club,
a non-profit organization,
     Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.
Utah Air Quality Board, an agency of the
State of Utah; and Utah Division of Air
Quality, an agency of the State of Utah,
     Respondents/Appellees.
    
Case No. 20080113
    
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT UTAH AIR QUALITY BOARD
Respondent Utah Air Quality Board (“Board”) submits this brief in response to the
Opening Brief submitted by Petitioner Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club (“Sierra Club”). 
The Board asks this Court to uphold the decision by the Board dated January 9, 2008.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals from which this case was certified has appellate
jurisdiction over the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies.  Utah Code Ann.(“UCA”) § 63-46b-16 (2004 & Supp.
2007) (renumbered in 2008 to 63G-4-403) and § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (2004 & Supp. 2007)
(renumbered in 2008 to 78A-4-103). 
2STANDARD OF REVIEW
The applicable provision of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”),
UCA §63-46b-16 (2007)  that governs the appropriate standards of review of an agency
determination is: 
. . . .
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency’s
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been
substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
. . . .
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
. . . .
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before
the court;
(h) the agency action is:
. . . .
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
. . . .
When reviewing formal agency decisions, the court applies differing standards of
review depending on the type of question before it.  See Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club
v. Utah Air Quality Bd, 2006 UT 74, ¶ 9, 148 P.3d 960, 965, 565 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 
The court “review[s] factual findings for substantial evidence,” while questions of law are
reviewed “for correctness.”  Id. (citing Esquivel v. Labor Comm’n, 2000 UT 66, ¶ 13, 7
P.3d 777).  “Substantial evidence exists when the factual findings support ‘more than a
mere scintilla of evidence . . . though something less than the weight of the evidence.’”
Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2007 UT
42 ¶ 35; 164 P.3d 384, 394 (Utah 2007) (citation omitted).  “An administrative law
3decision meets the substantial evidence test when ‘a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate’ the evidence supporting the decision.”  Id.  “[T]he party challenging the factual
findings must marshall all of the evidence and demonstrate that, despite the facts
supporting the decision, the ‘findings are not supported by substantial evidence.’” Id. at ¶
36.  
The court reviews an agency’s application of its own rule for reasonableness and
rationality.  Westside Dixon Assoc. v. Utah Power & Light, 2002 UT 31, ¶ 7, 44 P.3d 775
(“When reviewing an agency action that is [argued to be] ‘contrary to a rule of the
agency,’ we apply an intermediate standard of review, deferring to an agency’s
interpretation as long as it is both reasonable and rational”).  To the extent the court
reviews “mixed findings of fact and law . . . [agency] findings must be rationally based
and are set aside only if they are imposed arbitrarily and capriciously or are beyond the
tolerable limits of reason.”  Id. (citing Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Bd. of Oil, Gas &
Mining, 2001 UT 112, ¶18, 38 P.3d 291).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue 1.  Whether the Board erred in its interpretation of its Best Available 
Control Technology (“BACT”) rule, i.e.,  in not requiring consideration of carbon dioxide
(“CO2" ) and other greenhouse gases in the BACT determination for the Sevier Power
plant. 
Standard of Review – As raised by Sierra Club, Issue 1 has two parts and would
have two standards of review.  The first issue is whether the Board relied upon the correct
1 For purposes of this brief the terms “Executive Secretary” and “DAQ” may be
used interchangeably. 
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version of the BACT rule.  Were the Court to rule on this issue, it would present a
question of law to be reviewed for correctness.  However, Sierra Club did not preserve
this issue for appeal as it was never raised or argued.  (See Argument in Section I.)
The question of the Board’s interpretation of the requirements of its BACT rule
involves an agency’s interpretation of its own rule and is reviewed for reasonableness and
rationality. 
Issue 2. Whether the Board erred in affirming the Executive Secretary’s1
exclusion of Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (“IGCC”) technology from the
BACT analysis. 
Standard of Review –   Issue 2 consists of three parts: 
(1)  Whether the Board erred in its interpretation of its BACT rule, i.e., that the
rule not be used to redefine the source, involves an agency’s interpretation of its own rule
that is reviewed for reasonableness and rationality.
(2) Whether the Board erred in not requiring that IGCC be included in the
BACT analysis for the Circulating Fluidized Bed (“CFB”) boiler as proposed by the
applicant presents a mixed question of law and fact that must be rationally based and set
aside only if it is imposed arbitrarily and capriciously or is beyond the tolerable limits of
reason.
5(3) Whether IGCC is an available technology source is primarily a
question of fact reviewed for substantial evidence. 
Issue 3. Whether the Board erred in affirming the Executive Secretary’s
BACT analysis and determination of emission limits for nitrous oxides (NOx).  
Standard of Review –   Issue 3 consists of three parts:
(1) Whether the BACT review was adequate involves the Board’s
interpretation of the requirements of its own rule, and is reviewed for reasonableness and
rationality.  It also presents a mixed question of law and fact that must be rationally based
and set aside only if it is imposed arbitrarily and capriciously or is beyond the tolerable
limits of reason. 
(2) Challenged Findings of Fact 4, 15, 17, and 18 are reviewed for substantial
evidence.
(3) Whether the Board erred in affirming the emission limit of 0.10 lb/MMBtu 
(a thousand thousand British Thermal Units) as BACT for NOx presents a mixed question
of law and fact that must be rationally based and set aside only if imposed arbitrarily and
capriciously or it is beyond the tolerable limits of reason.  
Issue 4. Whether the Board erred in concluding that the Executive Secretary 
did not illegally exempt the proposed facility from a cumulative Class I increment
analysis.
Standard of Review –   Whether the Board erred in affirming the use of
Significant Impact Levels (“SILs”) involves an agency’s interpretation of its own rule
6reviewed for reasonableness and rationality.  It also presents a mixed question of law and
fact that must be rationally based and set aside only if it is imposed arbitrarily and
capriciously or is beyond the tolerable limits of reason. 
Issue 5. Whether the Board erred in affirming the Executive Secretary’s
cumulative Class I increment analysis regarding sulphur dioxide(“SO2") without requiring
the use of maximum actual three - and 24-hour emission rates, and allowing Sevier Power
Company (“Sevier Power”) to use average annual emission rates in its Class I increment
analysis. 
Standard of Review – Presents a mixed question of law and fact that must be
rationally based and set aside only if imposed arbitrarily and capriciously or beyond the
tolerable limits of reason.  
Issue 6. Whether the Board erred in affirming the Executive Secretary’s
determination to not revoke the approval order under the Board’s 18-month review rule.
Standard of Review –   Involves an agency interpreting its own rule, reviewed for
reasonableness and rationality.  It also presents a mixed question of law and fact that must
be rationally based and set aside only if imposed arbitrarily and capriciously or beyond
the tolerable limits of reason.  
Issue 7. Whether the cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of the
Board’s decision.
Standard of Review –   The doctrine requires reversal if the cumulative effect of 
several errors undermines the Court’s confidence that a fair trial was had.
7DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The interpretation of the following provisions is determinative of or of central
importance to this Court’s consideration of this appeal.
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL AUTHORITY, AND LIST OF ACRONYMS
The List of Acronyms used throughout this brief, and the following legal authority,
are attached as Addendum A:
A.   Statutory Provisions:
Federal
• 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(5) (SIP call provision)
• 42 U.S.C. § 7472(a) (Class I areas definition)
• 42 U.S.C. § 7471 (authorization for Prevention of Significant Deterioration
regulations)
• 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (BACT)
State
• Utah Code Ann. § 19-2-102(3) (definition of air pollution) 
• Utah Code Ann. § 19-2-104 (authority of Air Quality Board)
• Utah Code Ann. § 19-2-107(g) (Executive Secretary’s authority to issue approval
orders) 
• Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-3(4)(c)(renumbered in 2008 to § 63G-3-
201(4)(c)(exception to rulemaking requirements)
B. Administrative Rules:
Federal
• 40 C.F.R. § 51.166 (general requirements for state implementation plans)(Not
attached due to length)
• 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(21) (actual emissions)
• 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(r)(state source obligations)
• 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (approval of implementation plans)(Not attached due to length)
• 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(21) (actual emissions)
• 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(r) (federal source obligation)
• 40 C.F.R. § 52.2346 (approval of Utah’s SIP)
8State
• Utah Admin. Code R307-101-2(4) (former BACT rule)
• Utah Admin. Code R307-401-2 (current BACT rule)
• Utah Admin. Code R307-401-11 (former 18 month review rule)
• Utah Admin. Code R307-405-4(1) (area designations)
• Utah Admin. Code R307-405-6(2) (cumulative analysis/increment)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case:
Sevier Power  submitted a Notice of Intent (‘NOI”) to the Utah Division of Air
Quality ( “DAQ”) on April 1, 2003 and a revised NOI on September 10, 2003 to construct
and operate a 270 megawatt CFB coal-fired steam electric plant.  The proposed plant
would be equipped with limestone injection, a dry-lime scrubber, selective non-catalytic
reduction (“SNCR”) with ammonia injection and a baghouse for control of the various
emissions. The Sevier Power  project is a new major Prevention of Significant
Deterioration source.  Onsite meteorological monitoring, air dispersion modeling, air
quality impacts included visibility and Class I (i.e., National Parks) and a BACT review
were completed and submitted as part of the NOI.  New Source Performance Standards
also apply to this project as do Titles IV and V of the 1990 Clean Air Act (“CAA”).
Following a lengthy New Source Review (“NSR”), on October 12, 2004, the
Executive Secretary issued an Approval Order for the Sevier Power  project pursuant to
his authority under UCA § 19-2-107(g).  Sierra Club challenged the issuance of the
Approval Order by filing a Request for Agency Action.  Sierra Club’s Request for
Agency Action was adjudicated by the Board in a formal administrative proceeding.  The
9Board affirmed the issuance of the Approval Order.  Sierra Club now appeals.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
This matter is before the Court on a Petition for Judicial Review of the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Order of the Board regarding the issuance of an
Approval Order to Sevier Power  to construct and operate a 270 megawatt coal-fired
power plant in Sevier County, Utah.  Petitioners Sierra Club challenged the Approval
Order and the matter was heard by the Board pursuant to its authority as set forth in
Chapter 2 of Title 19 of the Utah Code, and the Board conducted the proceeding under
the provisions of Utah Administrative Code (“UAC”) R307-103 et seq. as a formal
adjudicative proceeding under the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act as set
forth in UCA § 63-46b-8. 
The Board granted summary judgment on the greenhouse gas issue (Issue I), oral
argument being heard on April 4, 2007, and the order signed on May 2, 2007.  SPC 3154
-3159.  The parties engaged in formal discovery, all witnesses submitted prefiled
testimony in addition to three full days of live testimony, and the parties submitted
prehearing briefs on the issues.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Board objects to those portions of Sierra Club’s Statement of Facts that are
either immaterial to the Court’s review or are simply argument.  
Greenhouse Gases / BACT
The Board refers the Court to the Board’s Order dated May 2, 2007 (SPC 3156-57)
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and also to its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.  (SPC 4695-96).  Sierra Club
incorrectly and inappropriately argues the significance of Massachusetts v. EPA, 127
S.Ct. 1438, 1451 (2007) in its Statement of Facts; and whether CO2 has been regulated
under the CAA. 
IGCC
Sevier Power’s NOI applied for an Approval Order to allow Sevier Power, to build
a power plant utilizing a CFB boiler.  SPC 4697.  IGCC differs from CFB in that CFB
burns coal to make steam, whereas IGCC puts coal through a thermochemical process
that converts, but does not burn, the coal into a syngas.  SPC 4733:183-84.  IGCC is a
different method of power generation.  SPC 4733:184.  IGCC is not an emission control
technology but is a unique power generation technology.  SPC 4733:187.  IGCC is not a
technology that can be designed into or added onto another power generation technology
such as CFB.  SPC 4733:188.  Using IGCC on the proposed plant instead of CFB would
redefine the design of the project.  SPC 4733:190.  The equipment that is used for the two
processes is very different.  SPC: 4733:104-05. 
Whether IGCC should be considered within the context of the BACT analysis
arose early in the Executive Secretary’s review process.  SPC 4571.  Well in advance of
the public comment period, DAQ management directed its permitting engineer, John
Jenks (“Jenks”), to investigate the issue further.  SPC 4571.  Jenks reviewed several
sources of information, including other state agencies’ recent (at the time) permitting
actions on this issue.  SPC 4571.  Anticipating that the issue would be raised during the
11
public comment period, the DAQ had a series of discussions between peers and
management to decide the BACT issue.  SPC 4572.  The DAQ reviewed the state and
federal definitions of BACT, EPA’s BACT guidance, and what information the DAQ
could find concerning the issue as other states dealt with the issue.  SPC 4572.  The result
of those discussions and continued review of the application throughout the public
comment period was that the Executive Secretary decided that IGCC would not be
included in the BACT analysis because it would involve a redefinition of the source.  SPC
4572.  
For its BACT review, the Executive Secretary elected to follow a “top-down”
methodology.  SPC 4573.   The Board found that the top-down method consists of (1)
identify control technology options (“Step 1"), (2) eliminate technically infeasible control
technologies, (3) rank remaining technologies, (4) evaluate the most effective controls,
and (5) select the most effective remaining option.  SPC 4698.  Only “available” control
options are required to be included in Step 1 of the BACT analysis.  SPC 4700.
The Executive Secretary hired an outside consultant in NSR permitting, Colin
Campbell (“Campbell”), to provide an independent third party review of the Sevier Power 
draft permit, particularly on the BACT issue.  SPC 4561-63, 4570, 4599-4600.  Campbell
had presented a number of training sessions attended by DAQ staff involving the
application of BACT and the NSR program in general and is recognized as an expert in
the field.  SPC 4562, 4570, 4599-4600.  The Executive Secretary considered how IGCC is
similar to and how it differs from the source proposed by the applicant, whether it is
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sufficiently similar to the proposed facility or whether it is a redefinition of the design of
the source.  SPC 4733:261 
NOx BACT
On Issue 3, the Board was asked to review whether the Executive Secretary
conducted a proper BACT analysis and determination of emission limits for NOx.  The
Executive Secretary determined the Best Available Control Technology for NOx as an
emission limit, 0.10 lb/MMBtu, based on a 24-hour rolling average with SNCR control
technology.  SPC 2536.
Sevier Power’s NOI proposed to use a CFB boiler with SNCR with ammonia
injection as a post-combustion control device for NOx control.  SPC 4701.  Sevier Power 
is required to employ BACT for NOx.  UAC R307-401-6(1).  Sevier Power  submitted a
BACT analysis for NOx with its NOI.  SPC 4701. Sevier Power’s BACT analysis
concluded that the proposed emission limit for NOx (0.10 lb/MMBtu based on a 24-hour
basis) was equivalent to or lower than other facilities using CFB boilers with SNCR.  SPC
4701.  The Executive Secretary conducted a BACT analysis and independently evaluated
control technologies with potential application to Sevier Power’s proposed CFB boiler. 
SPC 4701.  The Executive Secretary identified two technologies that were potentially
applicable to the Sevier Power  project: Selective Noncatalytic Reduction (“SNCR”)
which had been employed by Sevier Power and Selective Catalytic Reduction (“SCR”). 
SPC 4702.  
Sierra Club argued that more stringent limits should have been applied based on
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actual emissions data from other facilities and alternative averaging periods.  SPC 4703.
The Executive Secretary reviewed EPA’s BACT/RACT/LAER Clearinghouse, along
with web searches and a review of other sources using CFB boilers with SNCR to
approve an emission rate for NOx of 0.10 lb/MMBtu based on a 24-hour basis as BACT
for Sevier Power’s project.  SPC 4703-04.  The Board found that permits with different
time frames are statistically comparable to Sevier Power’s proposed emission limit of
0.10 lb/MMBtu on a 24-hour basis.  SPC 4704.  The Executive Secretary did not find
“any atmospheric CFB boiler with a lower emission limit expressed with the same
averaging period.”  SPC 4704.  The Board found that other facilities, including those
listed in the National Parks Service comments, are distinguished from the Sevier Power 
emission limits based on the type of technology, fuel used, size of facility, different
permit emission time periods and actual emissions versus permit emission limits.  SPC
4704.  The Executive Secretary approved Sevier Power’s selection of SNCR as BACT for
the Sevier Power project. SPC 4703.
The SILs Policy
SILs deem concentration levels that consist of 4 percent or less of the Class I
increment to be de minimis.  SPC 4714.  If a source models below the SILs, then the
analysis is deemed complete.  However, if a source models in above the Class I SILs,
then a cumulative Class I increment analysis is required.  SPC 4714. 
In evaluating the impact analysis requirement, the Board applied UAC R307-405-
6(2).  SPC 4713.  Prevention of Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) increments are the
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maximum allowable increases of particular pollutants, and PSD Class I increments are
incremental amounts of pollution above a baseline level that cannot be exceeded when
new sources are constructed near protected Class I areas.  SPC 4713-14.  
In September 2003, Sevier Power submitted its final permit application utilizing
the SILs modeling.  SPC 4715.  Based upon the SILs modeling showing de minimis
impact (less than 4 percent of the increment),  the Executive Secretary did not require a
full cumulative Class I increment analysis.  SPC 4715.
During the initial Sevier Power permitting process, upon DAQ’s suggestion,
Sevier Power’s modeler contacted the National Park Service for guidance on performing
a cumulative Class I analysis.  SPC 4714.  National Park Service had adopted the use of
Class I SILs and recommended SILs to both Sevier Power and the DAQ as the method to
follow for the far-field modeling effort.  SPC 4714; 4885.  Sevier Power initially
performed a cumulative increment analysis to include a Class I increment analysis for
Capitol Reef, Canyonlands, Zion, Arches, and Bryce National Parks.  SPC at 4714. 
Sevier Power’s cumulative analysis showed that the increments (both annual and short
term to include Class I increments) were not exceeded at any National Park.  SPC 4714.
In April 2004, the National Park Service reran Sevier Power’s cumulative analysis
using Sevier Power’s modeling files, but also added two additional facilities, Hunter Unit
1 and the proposed Intermountain Power Project (“IPP”) Unit 3 to its analysis, and
confirmed no Class I increment violations.  SPC 4715.
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Cumulative Class I Increment Analysis - 3-Hour, 24-Hour and Annual 
Average Increments
Though the Executive Secretary ultimately relied upon the SILs for Sevier Power’s
analysis, increment consuming sources within the domain (Utah and surrounding states)
were modeled.  SPC 4715-16.  Hunter Unit 1 and IPP Unit 3 were not included in the
cumulative Class I increment analysis conducted  by Sevier Power under UAC R307-405-
6(2).  SPC 4717.  The analysis did not include Hunter Unit 1 because the Executive
Secretary deemed Hunter Unit 1 to have been permitted and commenced construction
before the baseline date of January 6, 1975.  SPC 4715.  IPP Unit 3 was not included
because it was not an approved, permitted source at the time the Sevier Power Class I
increment modeling review took place.  SPC 4717.  
In a subsequent cumulative analysis performed by the National Park Service, both
IPP Unit 3 and Hunter Unit 1 were included and no Class I increment violations were
shown.  SPC 4717.  The PSD regulations, specifically 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(21) and §
51.21(b)(21), do not directly address how one is to determine actual emissions when
modeling short-term periods, such as three- and 24-hour averaging times for a cumulative
Class I increment analysis.  SPC 4718.  The Executive Secretary researched the issue and
determined that the use of average annual emissions yielded more reliable data than did
the use of maximum actual three- and 24-hour emission rates, and thus Sevier Power used
average annual emissions in its Class I increment analysis.  SPC 4717.  
Sierra Club’s expert acknowledged the question of which emission rates to use is
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unsettled.  SPC 4718.  She testified that modeling using all sources simultaneously
emitting at their short term maximum may be too extreme.  SPC 4718.  The EPA itself is
divided on what is an acceptable approach between the two. SPC 4718. The EPA signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) with the State of North Dakota stating that the
use of annual averages is an acceptable method for cumulative Class I increment analysis. 
SPC 4718.  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. CO2  The Board’s interpretation of its BACT requirement not to
require the regulation of CO2 and other greenhouse gases was reasonably and rationally
based and therefore should be affirmed.  The Board’s ruling is consistent with the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (April 2,
2007).  The parties do not dispute that the Board has not promulgated rules establishing
CO2 or other greenhouse gas standards. The Board cited the definition of air pollution as
defined in UCA §19-2-102(3), over which the Board has authority to control and regulate
(UCA § 19-2-104) as including the qualifying phrase “as determined by the rules adopted
by the board.”  The Board reasonably concluded that inasmuch as the Board has never
adopted rules governing CO2 or other greenhouse gases, it has no rules to apply or
enforce.  Further, the Board correctly applied the BACT regulation in place at the time
the permit was reviewed.  The applicant is entitled to have the permit application
reviewed based upon the substantive law in place at the time.  
II. IGCC  The Board’s approval of the determination that the BACT requirement not
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be used to fundamentally redefine the source and that consequently IGCC not be included
in the BACT analysis for the Sevier Power project was reasonably and rationally based. 
In interpreting its BACT requirement, the Board considered the language of the rule, EPA
guidance, actions of other states, and decisions of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
and the Environmental Appeals Board (“EAB”).  Further, the Board’s finding that “IGCC
is not an available technology, but is still in the developmental stage” is reasonably and
rationally based upon expert testimony. 
III. BACT / NOx     The Board’s approval of the NOx /BACT limit of 0.10
lb/MMBtu on a 24 hour average for the Sevier Power project was reasonably and
rationally based.  The Board evaluated what was included in the BACT review as well as
the testimony of expert witnesses as to the meaning of those comparisons.  Based upon
the evidence, the Board was satisfied that 0.10 lb/MMBtu is the lowest permit limit for
NOx for an atmospheric CFB boiler using SNCR and is BACT for the Sevier Power
project.  The Board was unpersuaded that the comparisons offered by Sierra Club’s expert
were sufficiently similar to be helpful or meaningful.
IV. SILS
The Board’s approval of the use of  SILs to comply with the requirements of UAC
R307-405-6(2) was reasonably and rationally based.  Further, contrary to Sierra Club’s
contention, use of SILs does not require rulemaking.  Because the source’s anticipated
concentration levels were below the di minimis amount of 4% or less, the Board
reasonably concluded that its rule does not require a source to perform a full cumulative
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analysis when the SILs shows that it would not result in a different answer.  The Board
also noted that a cumulative analysis was conducted in any event, which did not show an
increment violation.  Further, the Board correctly determined that SILs could be used as a
screening tool without rulemaking as it fits within the exception to the rulemaking
requirement as set forth in UCA § 63-46a-3(4) (2001).
V. Use of Maximum Actual Short Term or Average Annual Emission Rates in
Cumulative Class I Increment Analysis for SO2
The Board’s conclusion that use of average annual emissions in the 
cumulative impact analysis was allowed under the rule was reasonably and rationally
based upon its findings, which were supported by substantial evidence that (1) the use of
maximum actual short term SO2 emission rates overestimates the impact of those
facilities; and (2) the use of annual averages rather than maximum actual short term
emission rates more accurately reflects air quality.
  
VI. 18 Month Review
Sierra Club did not challenge the Findings and Conclusions of the Board that the
applicable rule on the 18 month review requirement was UAC R307-401-11, and that the
federal 18 month review statute was not applicable to the Sevier Power permit either at
the time the Approval Order was signed on October 12, 2004, or 18 months after, on
April 12, 2006.  Rather, Sierra Club makes a stringency argument that the Board erred by
not interpreting and applying its state rule as stringently as would be required under the
federal rule.  Sierra Club, however, misapplies a federal statute (42 U.S.C. § 7416), which
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applies only to New Source Performance Standards, not to Prevention of Significant
Deterioration permits.  
VII. Cumulative Error
Since the challenged findings are supported by substantial evidence and the
Board’s interpretation and application of its rules are reasonably and rationally based,
there is no basis for application of the cumulative error doctrine.
ARGUMENT
I:  THE BOARD CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT GREENHOUSE GASES
ARE NOT YET REGULATED IN UTAH AND PROPERLY NOT
INCLUDED IN BACT ANALYSIS
A. The Board’s Conclusion Not to Regulate is Consistent with
Massachusetts v. EPA  
The Board’s decision not to regulate greenhouse gases is consistent with the
Supreme Court opinion in  Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (April 2, 2007).  In that
case, a group of private organizations petitioned the EPA for rule making to begin
regulating the emissions of greenhouse gases, including CO2, under § 202(a)(1) of the
CAA (42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)).  Contrary to the EPA’s arguments, the Court held that
greenhouse gases fit within the definition of air pollution, and that the EPA’s rejection of
the rule making petition on that basis was impermissible.   Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. 1438
at 1462-63.  In referencing the Supreme Court’s determination that CO2 and other
greenhouse gases come within the definition of “air pollutant” subject to regulation under
the federal CAA, the Board correctly noted that neither the EPA nor the Board have, to
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date, adopted rules requiring limitations or consideration of CO2 or other greenhouse
gases as part of a NSR or a BACT determination.  SPC 4695. 
Sierra Club now argues for the first time (it was not argued before the Board) that 
CO2 is already “regulated” under the CAA.  Sierra Club misconstrues the 1990 CAA
Amendments, specifically as found in Section 821 (42 U.S.C. § 7651k note) which Sierra
Club contends directs the EPA to promulgate regulations within 18 months after the
enactment of the CAA Amendments of 1990 to monitor CO2 emissions from certain
regulated utilities.  The EPA addressed this issue in its Supreme Court brief in
Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. 1438:
In enacting [this] provision[], [ ] Congress expressly declined to authorize EPA
to impose emission limits.  In five separate places, Section 103(g) of the CAA
states that the “strategies and technologies” developed by EPA are to be
“nonregulatory.”  See 42 U.S.C. 7403(g)(1)-(4) Section 103(g) further
provides that “[n]othing in this subsection shall be construed to authorize the
imposition on any person of air pollution control requirements.”  42 U.S.C.
7403(g).  Section 602(e) similarly states that the requirement to identify the
global warming potential of various substances “shall not be construed to be
the basis for any additional regulation under this chapter.”  42 U.S.C.
7671a(e).  And Section 821 of the CAA Amendments of 1990, like Section
602(e) of the CAA, is directed solely at information-gathering.
Excerpt from the EPA brief to Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438 p.
26-27. (Addendum C).  In its decision, the Supreme Court did not reject the EPA’s
position on this point.
In the present case, the proper course for Sierra Club would have been to petition
the Board for rulemaking on the regulation of greenhouse gases, which it has not done.  In
the absence of rules establishing standards to enforce for regulating greenhouse gases, the
2The Board is aware of only one judicial case holding that CO2 must be included in
a BACT analysis.  In Friends of the Chattahoochee v. Envtl. Protection Div., Georgia
Dept. of Nat. Res., Docket No. 2008CV146398 (Superior Court of Fulton County, State
of Georgia, June 30, 2008) a Georgia Superior Court judge in a de novo review reversed
an ALJ’s decision, and held that CO2 must be included in a BACT analysis because it is
“subject to regulation.”  The decision does not explain how a regulatory agency is to
overcome the practical problem of requiring a BACT analysis for CO2 with no governing
standards or rules.   Nor does the decision (because it is a Georgia case) address the issue
in the context of Utah Code Ann. § 19-2-104, which is a fundamental part of the Board’s
decision. The Georgia court also ruled that IGCC must be included in a BACT analysis, a
holding contrary to the 7th Circuit and Environmental Appeal Board cases that have held
that a BACT analysis does not include redesigning the plant proposed by the permit
applicant. 
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Board reasonably interpreted the phrase “pollutant subject to regulation under the Clean
Air Act and/or the Utah Air Conservation Act” in its rule UAC R307-101-2, to
“reference[] pollutants for which the Board has established rules, not pollutants that could 
potentially be subject to rules.”2  SPC 4696.
B. Whether the Board Applied the Correct Version of the Rule was Not
Preserved for Appeal  
Sierra Club raises a new issue on appeal as to which version of the BACT
definition the Board should have applied:  the BACT definition in place at the time of the
permit application, or the BACT definition as amended in 2006.  Sierra Club
acknowledges in its brief that this issue was not preserved for appeal and as such is
subject to the plain error analysis, or, Sierra Club would assert, upon a showing of
substantial prejudice.  This court has held, however, that the preservation rule applies to
every claim unless a defendant can demonstrate plain error or exceptional circumstances. 
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74 ¶¶ 11,12, 404 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 10 P.3d 346, 351.
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To demonstrate plain error, “a defendant must establish that ‘(i) [a]n error exists;
(ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful.” Id. 
 In this instance, Sierra Club fails to meet either test.  In fact, in arguing the greenhouse
gas issue in its Opposition to Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings in 2007, Sierra Club
cited Utah Admin. Code R307-101-2 as the applicable Utah BACT regulation.  SPC
2900, n.102.  Sierra Club’s failure to meet either the plain error or substantial prejudice
test precludes it from raising this issue on appeal.   
In any event, Sierra Club’s reliance upon Heideman v. Washington City, 2007 UT
App. 11, 155 P.3d 900 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) is misplaced because (1) the 2006
amendment substantively changed the BACT rule, and (2) Sevier Power has obtained a
property interest in the form of an Approval Order.  This is in contrast to the petitioners in
Heideman who had never actually obtained a permit and thus had no property interest.  
II: IGCC BACT ISSUE
A. The Board Reasonably Interpreted its BACT Rule to Not Require a
Fundamental Redefinition of the Source
The Board’s interpretation and application of its BACT rule was both reasonable
and rational.  The primary point of contention between the Board and Sierra Club is
whether the BACT rule requires full consideration of a production process which would
fundamentally redefine the basic design or scope of a project proposed by an applicant. 
Sierra Club does not challenge the Board’s finding that IGCC is a power generation
technology, not an emission control technology.  Finding 10, SPC 4699.  Nor does Sierra
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Club challenge the Board’s finding that IGCC is not a technology that can be added onto
or designed into the proposed CFB installation “for the control of . . . pollutants.”  SPC
4699, Finding 11.  While Sierra Club comments on the EPA New Source Review
Workshop Manual (“NSR Manual”) and the actions of other states, the only Board
finding that Sierra Club challenges through any marshaling of evidence is the Board’s
finding that IGCC is not an “available” control option.  Finding 4, SPC 4700.
1. The Board Conducted Extensive Fact Finding to Support Its
Conclusions  
In arriving at its conclusions, the Board conducted extensive fact finding.  Each
Conclusion of Law is supported by the Findings of Fact, and each Finding of Fact is
supported by the record.  The Board received pre-filed as well as live testimony at
evidentiary hearing.  The Board concluded that “[u]nder the BACT definition in UAC
R307-101-2(4), IGCC does not need to be included in a BACT analysis, in that it is an
installation that is a different power production technology and to do so would require
redefining the source.”  Conclusion 1, SPC 4700.  In making this conclusion, the Board
interpreted the language of its BACT definition.  Finding 3, SPC 4697.  The Board did
fact finding on the method that may be used in a BACT analysis.  Finding 6, SPC 4698.  
The Board found facts on what the applicant must identify through a BACT analysis. 
Finding 5, SPC 4697-98.  The Board determined whether IGCC would redefine the
proposed source by doing fact finding on what IGCC is and how it works, as compared to
the technology proposed by the applicant.  Finding 7, SPC 4698; Finding 8, SPC 4698;
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Finding 9, SPC 4698-99; Finding 10, SPC 4699; Finding 11, SPC 4699.  And the Board
found facts on using the BACT requirement as a means to redefine the source.  Finding
12, SPC 4699; Finding 13, SPC 4699; Finding 14, SPC 4699-4700.  
The Board also concluded that “[i]n exercising any discretion the Executive
Secretary had to require or not require the inclusion of IGCC in Step 1 of the BACT
analysis, the Executive Secretary’s decision to not require the inclusion of IGCC was
reasonable.”  Conclusion 3, SPC 4700.  To support this conclusion, the Board found facts
on the top-down method and concluded that Step 1 identifies control technology options
for the particular installation proposed. Finding 5, SPC 4697 and Finding 6, SPC 4698. 
The Board also found facts on whether IGCC is a control technology for the technology
as proposed by the applicant.   Finding 9, SPC 4698-99; Finding 10, SPC 4699; Finding
11, SPC 4699.
The Board further concluded that “[e]ven if the Executive Secretary was otherwise
required to include IGCC in the BACT analysis, the Executive Secretary did not err by
not requiring consideration of IGCC in the BACT analysis because only ‘available’
control options are required to be included in Step 1, and, with respect to the Sevier
Power application, IGCC could not be considered an ‘available’ technology.  Conclusion
4, SPC 4700-01.  To support this conclusion, the Board found facts and interpreted its
rule that “only ‘available’ control options are required to be included in Step 1.”  Finding
15, SPC 4700. The Board then found facts on whether, with respect to the
SPC installation, IGCC is an “available” technology under its BACT or whether IGCC is
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still in the developmental stage.  Finding 16, SPC 4700.
2. The Board’s Interpretation of its BACT Requirement Squares 
with EPA Policy and Federal Case Law
The Board’s conclusions on this issue squares with EPA policy and
federal case law.  Consistent with the Board’s conclusion, the EPA’s EAB has
consistently held that the BACT requirement cannot be used to redefine the basic design
or scope of a proposed project.  See In re Knauf Fiber Glass, GMBH, 8 E.A.D. 121, 140
(EAB 1999); see also   In re Old Dominion Electric Cooperative Clover, Virginia, 3
E.A.D. 779, 793 n.38 (EPA Adm’r 1992); In re Pennsauken County, New Jersey,
Resource Recovery Facility, 2 E.A.D. 667, 673 (EPA Adm’r 1988).  
This principle against redefining the source was recently confirmed by the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals which, in Sierra Club v. EPA, 499 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 2007), 
affirmed a ruling by the EAB that BACT does not include redesigning the plant proposed
by the permit applicant.  The court distinguished between “‘control technology’ as a
means of reducing emissions from a power plant or other source of pollution and
redefining the ‘proposed facility’ (the plant or other source) -- changing its ‘fundamental
scope.”’  Id. at 655.   Distinguishing between adopting a control technology and
redesigning the proposed plant, the court stated that “[t]he project that must be addressed
when evaluating BACT is the project for which an application has been submitted . . . ” 
Id. at 656, quoting In re Prairie State Generating Co., 2006 WL 2847225 (EAB 2006). 
The Seventh Circuit observed that “traditionally, EPA does not require a . . . [permit]
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applicant to change the fundamental scope of its project.”  Id. at 654, quoting In re Old
Dominion, 3 E.A.D. at 793 n.38; NSR Manual at B.13.   Then, quoting language directly
from the similar federal BACT definition, the Seventh Circuit held that “[r]efining the
statutory definition of ‘control technology’ – ‘production processes and available
methods, systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or treatment of
innovative fuel combustion techniques’ --  to exclude redesign is the kind of judgment by
an administrative agency to which a reviewing court should defer.”  Id. at 655 (emphasis
added), quoting Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp, 127 S.Ct. 1423, 1434
(2007); New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 19-20 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Alabama Power Co. v.
Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 397-98 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
The Board’s decision also squares with EPA policy.  The NSR Manual states that
“production processes” or “available methods, systems and techniques for control of each
such pollutant” that would “redefine the design of the source” need not be included in the
BACT analysis. SPC 4837-38.  Sierra Club concedes that “[t]he NSR Manual does state
that ‘historically,’ BACT analysis has not required a permit applicant to redesign a
process,” but that the manual “does not compel any such result.”  Sierra Club brief at 29. 
The EPA recently reiterated its policy against using the BACT requirement to 
fundamentally redefine the proposed design of the source in its Response to Comments
dated August 30, 2007 on a draft PSD permit to construct another coal-fired power plant
on the Uintah-Ouray Indian Reservation in Utah: 
EPA’s policy reflects the Agency’s longstanding judgment that limits 
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should exist on the degree to which permitting authorities can dictate 
the design and scope of a proposed facility through the BACT analysis.  
This policy is based on a reasonable interpretation of sections 165 and 
169(3) of the CAA, which recognizes that, although the permitting authority 
must take comment on and may consider alternatives to a proposed facility, 
the BACT analysis itself is conducted without changing fundamental 
characteristics of the proposed source.
SPC 4858.
The “EPA ‘white paper’” referenced by Sierra Club in its brief is a paper produced
by the Clean Air Act Task Force, a non-EPA affiliated group advocating its position to
EPA’s Advanced Coal Technologies Working Group.  It is dated November 12, 2007 (the
date of the hearing), and was never presented to the Board or made a part of the Record. 
Therefore, it constitutes new evidence on appeal and the Board requests that it be stricken
and not considered.  See UCA. § 63-46b-16(4) (“appellate court shall grant relief . . . on
the basis of the agency’s record . . .”); Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Fuller, 603 P.2d 814, 817
(Utah 1979) (“[e]vidence not offered at the hearing cannot be considered for the first time
on appeal”). 
3. No Clear Congressional Intent
Sierra Club contends that the “innovative fuel combustion techniques” phrase (in
both the federal and state BACT definition) requires inclusion of IGCC in the BACT
analysis for the CFB boiler.  Contrary to Sierra Club’s contention, “Congress” has not
clearly manifested its intent on the issue.  Sierra Club’s brief relies upon a quote from
Senator Huddleston.  Senator Huddleston’s comments are far from a clear statement of
congressional intent on this issue.  In its Response to Public Comments for the Bonanza
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Power Plant, the EPA addressed its interpretation of the legislative history and Senator
Huddleston’s comment, stating that:
EPA does not read the legislative history cited by the commentor to require a
detailed evaluation of the IGCC technology in the BACT analysis for every
proposed facility that generates electricity from coal.  That Senator Huddleston
intended for the phrase ‘innovative fuel combustion techniques’ to encompass
‘gasification’ or ‘low Btu gasification’ does not necessarily require EPA or
other permitting authorities to identify the IGCC option as a candidate for
further analysis at step 1 of a top-down BACT review.  The ‘innovative fuel
combustion techniques’ phrase appears in the BACT definition among a list
of examples of things included in the phrase ‘production processes and
available methods, systems, and techniques.’  Thus, the ‘innovative fuel
combustion’ language, like the phrase it modifies in the definition of BACT,
is limited by other language discussed above that requires BACT to be applied
to each proposed facility and determined on a case-by-case basis.”  Thus, even
assuming that coal gasification was in all respects an innovative fuel
combustion technique for producing electricity from coal, we do not interpret
the Clean Air Act to require an ‘innovative fuel combustion technique’ to be
subject to a detailed BACT review when application of such a technique would
redesign the proposed source to the point that it becomes an alternative type
of facility, which, as discussed below, we believe would be the case if the
IGCC technology were applied to Deseret’s project.
EPA Response to Public Comments on PSD Permit to Construct, Bonanza Power Plant at
13.  SPC 4860.
B. The Board Reasonably Concluded that IGCC Technology is
Unavailable
Though not necessary to its determination that IGCC need not be considered in the
BACT analysis, the Board concluded that IGCC was not available based on Finding of
Fact 16.  It did so not based on an interpretation of the BACT definition, but based on
factual findings and testimony that IGCC is still in the “developmental stage.”  In support
of this finding, the Board referenced the prefiled and hearing testimony of Stephen
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Jenkins (“Jenkins”), an engineer who conducts feasibility studies, engineering and
planning of IGCC and gasification plants worldwide.  SPC 4733:178.  Involved with
IGCC since 1992 when he became Deputy Project Manager for Polk Power Station (the
second IGCC plant to go in service in the United States) and a member of the World
Class IGCC Experts Panel, Jenkins’ authority on IGCC as a technology was not
questioned.  SPC 4733:185-86.   Jenkins testified that IGCC “is still a developing
technology” employed in only four plants in the world.  SPC 4733:182.  Jenkins testified
that IGCC has a lot of potential capability to be a wonderful technology and he is
confident that it will, but it will take some time to develop.  SPC 4733:186.  On the
question of the operational availability of an IGCC system using coal as opposed to a
liquid feed stock, Jenkins testified that none of the four IGCC plants that use coal have
been able to achieve their design targets of 85 percent operational availability.  SPC
4733:197.  Jenkins testified that in 2004, and still today, IGCC is a developing
technology.  SPC 4733:209.
The evidence referred to by Sierra Club in its brief was considered by the Board
and rejected based on the testimony of Jenkins.  Reliance on his testimony was reasonable
and rational and constitutes substantial evidence in support of its Finding 16.
III. THE BOARD’S FINDINGS OF FACT SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSIONS ON
THE NOX AS BACT ISSUE
Issue 3 of Sierra Club’s appeal is that DAQ failed to provide adequate justification
for not requiring Sevier Power to meet the most stringent NOx BACT limits proposed or
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required for other CFB boilers.  SPC 3440.  Sierra Club’s contention is that the NOx
emission limit of 0.10 lb/MMBtu, 24-hour rolling average, as approved by the DAQ does
not represent BACT for the proposed CFB boiler.  SPC 3440.  
Sierra Club challenges 4 (of 18) Findings of Fact which supported in part the
Board’s Conclusions 2 and 3 –  that the Executive Secretary did not err and complied
with state rules in establishing the emission limit for NOx (0.10 lb/MMBtu based on a 24-
hour basis) as BACT in that it is equivalent to or lower than other facilities using CFB
boilers with SNCR (SPC 4705); and, that Sierra Club did not meet its burden of proving
that a more stringent emission limit was BACT.  SPC 4705. 
A. The Board Applied Facts to its BACT Rule.
Sierra Club challenges Findings 4, 15, 17 and 18.  With each Finding, the Board
cites the supporting record.  For Finding 4, the Board cites the testimony of Linda Conger
(“Conger”).  SPC 4701.  For Finding 15 and 17, the Board cites the testimony of Jenks and
Campbell.  SPC 4704.  For Finding 18, the Board cites the testimony of Jenks, Campbell,
Conger, and Mark Hennenfent (“Hennenfent”).  SPC 4704.  The Board also considered the
testimony of Sierra Club’s expert, Ranajit Sahu (“Sahu”), whom the Board cites in other
Findings. Finding 7, SPC 4702; Finding 13, SPC 4703.  The Board also had the agency
record available for those facts not in dispute.  
1. Finding 4 and 15 - A NOx emission limit of 0.10 lb/MMBtu 
on a 24-hour basis is equivalent to a limit of 0.07 lb/MMBtu on a
30 day average.
The Board heard testimony comparing NOx limits on three other plants that had
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been identified as having a lower emission limit using SNCR technology.  Considerable
focus was placed on this particular point through live expert testimony at the hearing.  SPC
4728:119-121, 127-45, 145-48 (Conger direct, cross, redirect, recross); SPC 4729:167-73,
190-93 (Jenks direct, cross); SPC 4731:633-36, 686 (Sahu redirect) SPC 4731:655-66, 675-
66 (Campbell redirect, recross).  The Board also had the benefit of questioning the
witnesses on this issue.  SPC 4728:148-51 (Conger); SPC 4729:212-14, 223-224 (Jenks);
4731:654-55 (Sahu).  
Conger, who oversaw the BACT analysis for Sevier Power, testified that the 
 three  Archer Midland Daniels facilities had been considered in the BACT analysis and
that their proposed emission limits of 0.07 lb/MMBtu based on a 30-day rolling average
were not as restrictive as the Sevier Power limit of 0.10 lb/MMBtu, since Sevier Power
must meet the proposed limits on a 24-hour basis which limits the time to account for short-
term averages.  SPC 3272-73.  DAQ permitting engineer, Jenks, testified in his pre-filed
testimony that the Archer Midland Daniels’ emission limit expressed on a 30-day rolling
average is statistically comparable to the Sevier Power project limit of 0.10 lb/MMBtu on a
24-hour rolling basis.  SPC 4021.  Sierra Club expert, Sahu, argued that the actual
variability of the actual emissions must be considered prior to making that determination. 
SPC 4731:634.  
In rebuttal, DAQ’s expert, Campbell, agreed with Jenks and Conger that the
variability in emissions between a 30-day long-term average and a 24-hour number is that
the 24-hour number is about 30 percent higher.  SPC 4731:657.  Campbell succinctly
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pointed out the errors in Sahu’s argument.  Campbell agreed with Sahu that the only way to
compare stringency is to look at facilities configured the same way and see what they can
actually achieve based on real world operation of those facilities, but that is where his
agreement with Sahu ended.  SPC 4731:656.  Campbell disagreed with Sahu’s claim that
.07 on a 30-day average is more stringent than .1 on a 24-hour average, his problem with
the facilities cited by Sahu being that Sahu referred to existing facilities for a number of
different kinds of comparisons, but that the only operating CFB that Sahu referred to was
Gilberton Power (“Gilberton Facility”) in Pennsylvania.  SPC 4731:656-59.   Campbell
consulted the acid rain database (one of the databases advocated by Sierra Club) for that
facility and examined its actual data, and found that the most stringent 24-hour limit with
which the Gilberton facility could comply is almost .13 pounds per million BTU, 25 or 35
percent higher than the Sevier Power limit.  SPC 4731:659.  Campbell described the data
relied on by Sahu for the premise that lower levels are achievable as “terribly misleading
analysis.”  SPC 4731:660.  
Campbell acknowledged that a CFB boiler with SNCR would likely achieve less
than .1 on the vast majority of days and might achieve less than .06 on some days, but
pointed out that the limit must be achievable continuously to be in compliance and that
permit limits should not be so strict as to guarantee noncompliance.  SPC 4731:661. 
Campbell stated that he went to the acid rain database and obtained the data on every
facility cited by Sahu, and the single most stringent limit that any of those boilers could
demonstrate compliance with on a 24-hour averaging period was a limit of .15 pounds per
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million BTU heat input.  SPC 4731:662.  
2. Finding 17: Other Facilities Including Those Listed in the National
Park Service Comments are Distinguishable from Sevier Power
Emission Limits
Included among the findings in support of its conclusion that 0.10 lb/MMBtu on a
24-hour basis is BACT for NOx, is Finding 17, wherein the Board distinguished other
facilities from the Sevier Power emission limits “based on the type of technology, fuel
used, size of facility, different permit emission time periods and, actual emissions versus
permit emission limits.”  Finding 17, SPC 4704.  Sierra Club asserts that the Board erred by
defining the concept of similar source in the BACT analysis for NOx too narrowly, citing
the testimony of Sahu that EPA guidance “exhorts the applicant and the reviewing agency
to cast the net wider . . .”  SPC 3394. 
In support of its Finding 17, the Board cited the hearing testimony of Jenks and
Campbell.  Finding 17, SPC 4704.  Jenks testified that the purpose in evaluating similar
sources is to make sure that the emission limit is as stringent as any other similar source in
the country applying the same type of control technology in an appropriate manner.  SPC
4729:164.  Jenks testified that there are three basic considerations in determining which
sources were similar enough.  First, that it matched the category of facility sought by the
permit application, in this case an atmospheric CFB boiler.  Thus, the search was limited to
sources in that same category because anything outside of that range would not have the
same permit limit.  SPC 4729:164-65.  The second step is to look at plants of that type that
were burning coal, as anything not burning coal would have a vastly different permit limit. 
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SPC 4729:165.  The third step is to review those plants that were in roughly the same size
category.  SPC 4729:165.  Jenks testified that based upon his search, the limit settled upon
was as good or better than any other similar source permitted for this type of process.  SPC
4729:165. 
Campbell stated his opinion that 0.10 MMBtu for NOx based on a 24 hour average
is BACT for the proposed facility.  SPC 4731:657-58.  Campbell stated that the emission
limit is what is achievable, SPC 4731:658, and that it is not appropriate for determining
BACT to speculate in setting limits about what is probably achievable – so the
determination must be based on existing data.  SPC 4731:658.  Campbell stated that while
Sahu claimed the existence of atmospheric CFB boilers where SCR is being demonstrated
to be achieving lower emission limits than .10, Campbell was not aware of any, and that
there is only one facility for which Sahu has cited actual emissions data, that being the
Gilberton facility..  SPC 4731:659.  Campbell stated that the most stringent limit with
which the Gilberton facility has shown it could comply is about .13 lb/MMBtu, 25 to 35
percent higher than the Sevier Power limit.  SPC 4731:659.  Campbell stated his opinion
that Sahu’s submittal of a number of facilities where he gathered data and relied on that
data for the premise that lower levels are achievable is a “terribly misleading analysis”
because (1) not a single facility was an atmospheric CFB boiler but rather, mostly were
pulverized coal fired units and one or two wet bottom cyclone fired units with SCR, SPC
4731:660, (2) Sahu selectively provided a list of days on which those boilers achieved less
than .1 lb/MMBtu, rather than what was achieved continuously (SPC 4731:660-61); and (3)
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Campbell went to the acid rain database and obtained the data on every facility Sahu cited,
and the single most stringent limit with which any one of those boilers could achieve
compliance on a 24-hour averaging period was .15 lb/MMBtu.  SPC:4731:661.
Regarding the Gilberton facility, Campbell pointed out in his pre-filed testimony
that in 2004, its emissions exceeded the emission limit that Sahu proposed for the Sevier
Power facility over more than seventy-five percent of its operating hours.  SPC 3472.  Even
more telling, Campbell testified, was that in calendar year 2005, the Gilberton facility’s
emissions would have resulted in twenty exceedances of the BACT emission limit in the
Sevier Power Approval Order.  SPC:3472.
Campbell acknowledged that there are some pulverized coal-fired boilers being
permitted for .05 to .07 lb/MMBtu with SCR, but pointed out that those limits raise two
separate issues.  First, whether SCR is technically feasible, and if it were hypothetically,
what limit would be achievable?  Then with SNCR, what limit is achievable on a
continuous basis?  SPC 4731:662.  Campbell went on to state that he agrees with Sahu that
if SCR were technically feasible for the application to a CFB boiler burning coal, that the
achievable number would be less than .03 lb/MMBtu, but then explained why SCR was not
feasible.  SPC 4731:Id. at 662.  Sierra Club expressly stated in footnote 11, page 37 of its
appellate brief, that it is not appealing DAQ’s decision to select SNCR as the pollution
control equipment for the Sevier Power facility.  
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3. Finding 18: The Emissions Limit for NOx for the Sevier Power
Project, 0.10 lb/MMBtu Based on a 24 Hour Basis is the Lowest
Permit Limit for NOX for an Atmospheric CFB Boiler and is
BACT for the Sevier Power Project
In support of its contention that the Sevier Power permit limit for NOx was not
sufficiently stringent, Sierra Club pointed to two facilities – JEA Northside (“Northside
facility”), with a NOx permit limit of 0.09 lb/MMBtu on a 30-day rolling average, and AES
Puerto Rico (“Puerto Rico facility”), with a limit of 0.10 lb/MMBtu 30-day rolling average. 
Sierra Club brief at 43, citing SPC 4929 and 4903 respectively.  Sierra Club pointed to the
fact that during 2002, the Northside facility achieved an emission rate of 0.04-0.06
lb/MMBtu for NOx while burning coal, and the Puerto Rico facility achieved an emission
rate of 0.071.  Sierra Club brief at 43, citing SPC 4929 and 4903  Sierra Club then goes on
to contend that accepted control efficiency numbers for SNCR and EPA boiler-out NOx
emission rates for the proposed Sevier Power plant should have been limited to at least
0.034 lb/MMBtu.  Sierra Club brief at 44, citing SPC 3394.  Campbell addressed the
comparable emissions between a 30 day average and a 24 hour average.  He testified that
he went to the acid rain data base for the Gilberton facility, and comparing the long term
average emissions with the limits the plant could comply with on an ongoing basis,
confirmed that the 24-hour number is about 30 percent higher than the 30-day long-term
average.  SPC:4731:657. 
Based upon the above, the record contains substantial evidence to support Findings
of Fact 4, 15, 17, and 18.  The Board concluded that the Executive Secretary did not err and
3UCA § 63-46a-3(2) and (3) are not applicable, in that they provide:
(2)   In addition to other rulemaking required by law, each agency shall make rules
when agency action:
(a) authorizes, requires, or prohibits an action;
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complied with state rules in establishing the emission limit (0.10 lb/MMBtu based on a 24
hour basis) as BACT in that it is equivalent to or lower than other facilities using CFB
boilers with SNCR.  This conclusion was reasonable and rational and should be upheld.  
IV. THE  BOARD CORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE DAQ’S USE OF SILS TO
COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE RULE
The Board’s approval of the use of SILs to comply with the requirements of UAC
R307-405-6(2) was reasonably and rationally based.  Further, contrary to Sierra Club’s
contention, use of SILs does not require rulemaking.
A. The Use of SILs As Technical Guidance on How to Apply Rule Falls 
Within an Exception Under the Rulemaking Act
SILs are concentration levels that consist of four percent or less of the Class I
increment.  Finding 5, SPC 4714.  The Board correctly concluded that the use of SILs was
an appropriate screening device in the application of and determinations to be made under
UAC R307-405-6(2), without the need for rulemaking because as agency guidance on the
application of a rule, it fits within the exception to the rulemaking requirement as set forth
in UCA § 63-46a-3(4)(c) which states:
(4) Rulemaking is not required when:
. . . .
(C) an agency issues policy or other statement that are advisory, 
informative, or descriptive, and do not conform to the requirements of
Subsections (2) and (3);3
(b) provides or prohibits a material benefit;
(c) applies to a class of persons or another agency; and
(d) is explicitly or implicitly authorized by statute.
(3)   Rulemaking is also required when an agency issues a written interpretation of
a state or federal legal mandate.
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The Executive Secretary’s internal memorandum dated December 16, 2003,
provides guidance on the way that the staff is to make the technical determination on air
quality impact as required by the rule, UAC R307-405-6(2). SPC 4760-61.  As such, the
SILs memorandum is a policy that is “advisory, informative, or descriptive,” as stated in
UCA § 63-46a-3(4)(c), and does not fit within the language of Sections 2 and 3. 
Specifically, the SILs policy does not fit within the criteria of (2), and as to (3), does not
purport to interpret a federal or state legal mandate or “interpret[] the scope of the [Board’s]
statutory or regulatory power . . . .”  C.P. v. Utah Office of Crime Victims’ Reparations 966
P.2d 1226, 1230-31 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).  
This instruction to use SILs represents a technical determination as to what analysis
is adequate to demonstrate “whether the source will cause or contribute to a violation of the
maximum allowable increase or the NAAQS [National Ambient Air Quality Standards] in
any area.” UAC R307-405-6(2).  This Court has recognized as a “legitimate administrative
practice” the use of such “interpretive guidelines.”  Mt. Fuel Supply Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 861 P.2d 414, 420 (Utah 1993).  
The SILs process as outlined in the Executive Secretary’s memorandum is similar to
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the process used by the EPA, National Park Service, and other states in administering rules
that require technical determinations.   SPC 4040.  The Executive Secretary’s instruction to
staff that accepts the use of SILs is not subject to the requirements of the Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act, and the Board’s Order should be affirmed.
B. The Board’s Application of UAC R307-405-6(2) was Reasonable
The Board applied UAC R307-405-6(2), which states:
Every new major source or major modification must be reviewed by the
Executive Secretary to determine the air quality impact of the source to
include a determination whether the source will cause or contribute to a
violation of the maximum allowable increases or the NAAQS in any
area.  The determination of air quality impact will be made as of the
source's projected start-up date.  Such determination shall take into
account all allowable emissions of approved sources or modifications
whether constructed or not, and, to the extent practicable, the
cumulative effect on air quality of all sources and growth in the affected
area. 
Emphasis added.
 In concluding that the Executive Secretary did not err in using SILs as
 an appropriate screening device for determining under UAC R307-405-6(2) whether a
source would cause or contribute to violations of maximum allowable increases or whether
a full cumulative Class I increment analysis is required to make that demonstration, the
Board conducted extensive fact finding to determine compliance with the rule.  The Board
found that the use of SILs as a screening tool is widely accepted and the recommended
method to follow by the National Park Service for the far field modeling effort.  Findings 8
and 9, SPC 4714-15; see also SPC 4885.
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Relevant to evaluating the technical appropriateness of the use of SILs in this case,
the Board found that Sevier Power initially performed a Class I increment analysis for
Capitol Reef, Canyonlands, Zion, Arches, and Bryce National Parks.  Finding 3, SPC 4714. 
The Board found that the Sevier Power cumulative analysis showed that the increments
(both annual and short term, to include Class I increments) were not exceeded at any
National Park.  Finding 4, SPC 4714.  The Board found that Sevier Power performed
modeling for the Sevier Power facility, and the modeled maximum concentrations came in
below the Class I increment and Class I SILs.  Finding 10, SPC 4715.  Finally, the Board
also found that in April 2004, the National Park Service reran SPC’s cumulative analysis
modeling referenced in Finding 10, using Sevier Power’s modeling files, but also added the
Hunter 1 plant and the proposed IPP Unit 3 plant to its analysis, and confirmed no Class I
increment violations.  Finding 12, SPC 4715. 
Based upon its Findings of Fact, the Board concluded that the use of SILs is an
appropriate screening device to determine, under UAC R307-405-6(2), whether the
proposed Sevier Power facility would cause or contribute to violations of the maximum
allowable increases.  Conclusion 1, SPC 4715.  
C. The Purpose of UAC R307-405-6(2) was Met
The express requirement of UAC R307-405-6(2) is that the Executive Secretary
review the proposed source “to determine the air quality impact of the source to include a
determination whether the source will cause or contribute to a violation of the [increment]”
and that “[s]uch determination shall take into account all allowable emissions of approved
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sources or modifications . . ., and, to the extent practicable, the cumulative effect on air
quality of all sources and growth in the affected area.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Thus,
although a source’s individual contribution must be determined, in circumstances where the
impact of a proposed source is less than four percent of the Class I increment, the analysis
is not considered to be “practicable” or necessary.  
When a source’s anticipated impact is below the applicable SILs for a particular
pollutant, its impact is deemed de minimus and the proposed source is not considered to
“cause or contribute to a violation of the [increment,]” which is the determination that the
rule requires be made.  “. . . . the Agency must be allowed some discretion to disregard de
minimis increases: “Courts should be reluctant to apply the literal terms of a statute to
mandate pointless expenditures of effort.’”  Connecticut Fund for the Environment, Inc. v.
EPA, 696 F.2d 179, 183 (2nd Cir. 1982), quoting Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d
323, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1979).  The Board reasonably concluded that its rule does not require a
source to perform the full cumulative analysis when use of the SILs shows that the full
analysis would not change the result.
D. Sierra Club has not Shown that it was Prejudiced by the Use of SILs
The Board made uncontroverted findings that Sevier Power and the National Park
Service both conducted a cumulative Class I increment analysis which came in below the
Class I increment and Class I SILs.  Coupling those findings with the Board’s conclusions
that both cumulative analyses were valid (Conclusions 1 through 7, SPC 4719-20), Sierra
Club has not shown how, even if it was error in using SILs, the full analysis would have
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made any difference.  “For a reviewing court to grant relief under the [UAPA], it must
determine, on the basis of the agency’s record, that the party has been ‘substantially
prejudiced’ by the agency action.”  WWC Holding Co., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 2001
UT 23 ¶ 7; 44 P.3d 714, 718 (Utah 2002); Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4).  “The party has
been substantially prejudiced if ‘the alleged error was not harmless.’” Id., quoting Mtn.
Fuel Supply Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 861 P.2d 414, 423 (Utah 1993).   
This standard is identical for appeals from both judicial and administrative
proceedings, and “an error will be harmless if it is ‘sufficiently inconsequential that . . .
there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.’” 
Morton Intern., Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm’n, 814 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah
1991), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Martinez v. Media-Paymaster
Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2007 UT 42 ¶ 41; 164 P.3d 384, 395
(Utah 2007).  The burden to show substantial prejudice is on Sierra Club: “. . . . the
aggrieved party must be able to demonstrate how the agency's action has prejudiced it.” 
Mtn. Fuel Supply Co., 861 P.2d at 423.  Because the full cumulative analysis that Sierra
Club desires would not change the result, Sierra Club has not been prejudiced.
V. THE BOARD CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE SEVIER POWER
FACILITY WILL NOT CONTRIBUTE TO SO2 VIOLATIONS AT CAPITOL
REEF NATIONAL PARK
As a preliminary matter, because a cumulative analysis is not required if a proposed
source’s contributions are below the SILs (as addressed in Issue IV), Issue IV is dispositive
of Issue V.  Thus, should the Court affirm the Board on Issue IV, it need not address the
4  SPC 4716 (Addendum A).
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allegations of error outlined by Sierra Club in Point V. 
Point V appeals the Board’s Findings and Conclusions on Issue 9 in Sierra Club’s
Request for Agency Action.  At hearing, Issue 9 presented the question of “whether the
Executive Secretary violated Utah rules because, as permitted, the proposed facility will
contribute to Class I SO2 increment violations at Capital Reef National Park.”  SPC 4716. 
On appeal, Sierra Club initially frames the issue as whether the Board erred in “affirming
the DAQ’s cumulative Class I increment analysis regarding SO2 without requiring analysis
of 3- and 24-hour peak-period emissions, or in the alternative, by accepting a federal
analysis offered in lieu of the analysis that the DAQ was required to perform.”  Sierra Club
brief at 4. 
A. The Challenged Findings of Fact are Supported by Substantial 
Evidence
In Point V, Sierra Club challenges Findings 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 of
Issue 9 of the Board’s Order.
1. Finding 2 is Supported by Substantial Evidence
To demonstrate that the Board erred, Sierra Club must demonstrate that the Board’s
factual determinations are not supported by substantial evidence, and then that the Board’s
findings are not rationally based and are imposed arbitrarily and capriciously or are beyond
the tolerable limits of reason.  Finding 2 is supported by substantial evidence.4  It is almost
a verbatim repeat of the testimony of Sevier Power’s modeler George Wilkerson
5  SPC 4717 (Addendum A). 
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(“Wilkerson”) and is in reference to when the DAQ, early in the permitting process, told
Sevier Power that a cumulative analysis would be required.  SPC 3334-35.  The use of the
SILs referenced by Sierra Club in SPC 1027 is from the Engineering Review, which was
based on Sevier Power’s final permit application. 
By that time, the Executive Secretary had decided to utilize the SILs.  SPC 4289. 
Thus, Sierra Club’s reference to the Engineering Report does not contradict the Board’s
finding that prior to adopting and relying on the SILs, the DAQ had required Sevier Power
to conduct a cumulative analysis.  Sierra Club’s other record references likewise fail to
contradict the Board’s finding.  SPC 2526-28 cites the DAQ’s responses to comments
submitted during the public comment period, in which the DAQ cited its SILs guidance as
a reason for not requiring a Class I cumulative analysis.  The responses to comments are
dated September 27, 2004, after the Executive Secretary had adopted the SILs, and after
Sevier Power had submitted its final permit application based on use of the SILs.  SPC
2494.  
2. Finding 5 is Supported by Substantial Evidence  
Sierra Club challenges the Board’s Finding 55 that construction on Hunter Unit 1
had commenced before the baseline date of January 6, 1975, and that the EPA agrees with
that determination.  The determination the Board had to make in determining whether
Hunter Unit 1 should have been included in the cumulative SO2 increment analysis was
whether construction of Hunter 1 had commenced before the baseline date of January 6,
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1975.  If Hunter 1 had commenced construction prior to that date, it would be legitimately
excluded from the inventory of increment-consuming sources in any cumulative analysis
for the Sevier Power facility.  Commence” construction is defined as when an:   
owner or operator has all necessary pre-construction approvals or permits and
either has: (1) Begun, or caused to begin, a continuous program of actual
on-site construction of the source, to be completed within a reasonable time;
or (2) Entered into binding agreements or contractual obligations, which
cannot be canceled or modified without substantial loss to the owner or
operator, to undertake a program of actual construction of the source to be
completed within a reasonable time.
UAC R307-101-2.  
In support of its determination that construction of Hunter Unit 1 commenced prior
to the baseline date, the Executive Secretary introduced Exhibit 13, an EPA memorandum
providing guidance on the interpretation of the “commence construction” requirement. 
SPC 4796.  Sierra Club agrees that “the definition of commence construction cited in
Exhibit 13 is the same that is used in connection with determining whether a source
consumes increment.”  Sierra Club brief at 48 n.24.  
The Executive Secretary introduced  several exhibits in support of its defense that
Hunter Unit 1 does not consume increment.  SPC 4795-4815.  Among those exhibits is the
permit granted by the Utah Air Conservation Committee (predecessor to the Board) to Utah
Power & Light to construct Hunter Units 1 and 2.  SPC 4795.  Dated December 12, 1973,
this exhibit goes directly to the question of satisfying the commence construction criteria
and satisfies the aspect of the “commence construction” requirement of UAC R307-101-2
to have “all necessary pre-construction approvals or permits.” SPC 4795.  The Executive
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Secretary also introduced Exhibit 13, a December 18, 1975 memorandum from the EPA to
its regional administrators, containing guidelines for how to determine when a source had
commenced construction.  SPC 4796-99.  This exhibit provides further clarification on the
case-by-case evaluation necessary to determine when a source has commenced
construction, and states in part:
There may be situations where, although actual on-site work has not
commenced or been contracted for, the source is so irrevocably committed to
a particular site that it should be considered as having commenced
construction.  Such situations could include sources which are only a few days
or weeks from commencing on-site construction or sources which have
contracted for or constructed unique site specific facilities or equipment which
are not yet being installed on-site.  Such situations will be rare but may be
taken into account in determining whether the source is in effectively the same
position as if it had commenced on-site construction.
SPC 4797.
 Sierra Club argues that the documents introduced as Executive Secretary’s Exhibits
17 and 18 are dispositive as to date of construction. SPC 4808-15.  However, Exhibit 13,
unchallenged by Sierra Club, goes directly to the question of what showing must be made
to be considered as having commenced construction for purposes of increment
consumption.  Determination of when a source commenced construction is highly fact-
dependent and may be based on more than just the dates.  A critical determination is also
whether the source “is so irrevocably committed to a particular site that it should be
considered as having commenced construction.”  SPC 4797.  Cheryl Heying (“Heying”)
testified that based on EPA guidance in Exhibit 13, it was possible for a source to be
included in the baseline concentration even if it were just a few weeks away from
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construction.  SPC 4729:261.  Heying also testified at hearing that the dates in Exhibits 17
and 18 do not match and thus are confusing.  SPC 4729:264-65.  Heying testified that it
was the DAQ’s position that based on the available evidence, Hunter Unit 1 “actually was
constructed . . . prior to the date where you would start counting increment consuming
sources.”  SPC 4729:265.  Sierra Club’s cross-examination on this issue, on the other hand,
focused exclusively on the dates in Exhibits 17 and 18.
In its April 6, 2004 comments on the proposed permit, the EPA had reviewed the
NOI, which included the inventory of increment-consuming sources for the cumulative
analysis, but did not take issue with the fact that Hunter Unit 1 did not appear in the
inventory.  SPC 0277-78.  The EPA’s only comments in regard to the analysis went to
whether pending projects, such as IPP Unit 3, had been included.  SPC 4303.  Given the
thoroughness of EPA’s review of the permit proposal, the fact that EPA reviewed Sevier
Power’s cumulative analysis (including the inventory) and did not argue for the inclusion of
Hunter Unit 1 cannot be attributed to oversight, and indicates that, consistent with both the
DAQ’s and the EPA’s historical understanding, the EPA does not consider Hunter Unit 1 to
be an increment-consuming source.  Finally, Sierra Club provided no evidence to show that
EPA has ever considered Hunter 1 to be an increment-consuming source.
3. The National Park Service included Hunter Unit 1 in its 
Cumulative Analysis and its Exclusion by Sevier Power would be 
Harmless Error 
In any event, the National Park Service conducted its own cumulative analysis that
included Hunter Unit 1, and still did not show an increment violation.  SPC 4311.  In
6  SPC 4717 (Addendum A).
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Finding 7, the Board specifically determined that “[i]n a subsequent cumulative analysis
performed by the National Park Service, both IPP Unit 3 and Hunter Unit 1 were included
and no Class I increment violations were shown.”  SPC 4717.  Sierra Club challenges the
National Park Service analysis for other reasons, but not that the analysis did not include
Hunter Unit 1.  Thus, because the National Park Service analysis did include Hunter 1 and
no violations were shown, Sierra Club cannot show that the error caused it substantial
prejudice.  WWC Holding Co., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 2001 UT 23 ¶ 7; 44 P.3d 714,
718 (Utah 2002) (party is only substantially prejudiced if “‘the alleged error was not
harmless.’”) Id., quoting Mtn. Fuel Supply Co., 861 P.2d at 423; UCA § 63-46b-16(4). 
4. Finding 6 is Supported by Substantial Evidence
Sierra Club’s challenge to the Board’s Finding 66 relates to the requirement under
UAC R307-405-6(2) that the Executive Secretary must consider allowable emissions from
all “approved” sources.  Both Sierra Club and the Board appear to agree that the Executive
Secretary approved IPP Unit 3 shortly after approving the Sevier Power project, in that the
permits were signed three days from each other.  SPC 2532.  The Board also agrees that
IPP Unit 3 received its approval order before the predicted Sevier Power start-up date.
Wilkerson testified that Sevier Power’s cumulative analysis “did not include new sources
not yet permitted” and that “review of [the] IPP 3 permit application was on-going and was
not completed at the time Sevier Power conducted the cumulative PSD Class I increment
analysis.”  SPC 3337.   
49
Sierra Club’s contention that IPP Unit 3 should have been included because the
Executive Secretary approved IPP Unit 3 before the predicted Sevier Power start-up date is
a misapplication of UAC R307-405-6(2).  Although the regulation does require a
determination of whether the proposed source (Sevier Power in this case) will contribute to
an increment violation “as of [Sevier Power’s] start-up date,” the inventory of increment-
consuming sources used for a cumulative analysis only includes sources that are approved
at the time the analysis is performed, not sources that might at a later time become
approved.  UAC R307-405-6(2) (the analysis includes “allowable emissions of approved . .
. sources, whether constructed or not . . . .”) (emphasis added).  Sierra Club provided no
evidence to show that IPP Unit 3 was approved at the time Sevier Power conducted its
analysis.
In determining whether IPP Unit 3 should be included in the inventory of increment-
consuming sources under UAC R307-405-6(2), the Board correctly considered whether IPP
Unit 3 was an approved or permitted source at the time of SPC’s cumulative analysis, and
its finding that it was not is not contested by Sierra Club.  
In any event, just as in the inclusion of Hunter Unit 1, the Board found (and Sierra
Club does not dispute) that in a subsequent cumulative analysis performed by the National
Park Service, both IPP Unit 3 and Hunter Unit 1 were included and no Class I increment
violations were shown.  SPC 4717.  The Executive Secretary’s not requiring the inclusion
of IPP Unit 3 in the cumulative increment analysis performed by Sevier Power is therefore
harmless error, as Sierra Club cannot show that it has been substantially prejudiced.  WWC
7  SPC 4717 (Addendum A).
8  SPC 4718 (Addendum A).
9  SPC 4718 (Addendum A).
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Holding Co., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 2001 UT 23 ¶ 7; 44 P.3d 714, 718 (Utah 2002).
5. Finding 7 is Not Disputed by the Record
For purposes of Finding 7,7 Sierra Club does not dispute that both IPP Unit 3 and
Hunter Unit 1 were included in the National Park Service’s cumulative analysis.  In
evaluating substantial prejudice, the only inquiry is whether the Executive Secretary’s not
requiring the performance of a cumulative analysis to include IPP Unit 3 and Hunter Unit 1
resulted in harm to the petitioner.  If not, Sierra Club cannot show that it was “substantially
prejudiced.”  Mtn. Fuel Supply Co., 861 P.2d at 423. 
6. Finding 9 is Based Upon Plain Reading of Federal Rules
Sierra Club claims that Finding 98 is a legal conclusion, but does not dispute its
substance:  that the regulations “do not directly address how one is to determine the actual
emissions when modeling short-term periods, such as three- and 24-hour averaging times
for a cumulative Class I increment analysis.”  SPC 4718.  To support its finding, the Board
cites the testimony of Wilkerson.  SPC 3336.  Sierra Club did not cross-examine on this
point, and has presented nothing to contradict the Board’s finding.
7. Findings 11 and 12 are Supported by Substantial Evidence
In support of Finding 11,9 the Board references the hearing testimony of Sierra Club 
10  SPC 4718 (Addendum A).
11  SPC 4718 (Addendum A).
51
expert, Dr. Jana Milford (“Milford”).  SPC 4718.  In support of Finding 12,10 the Board
references the hearing testimony of both Heying and Milford.  SPC 4718.  When Milford
was asked whether she agreed that the question of which emissions to use was probably
unsettled, Milford responded that she “would agree that the question is unsettled.”  SPC
4729:302.  When asked whether she believed that maximum actual emissions be used in
increment analysis, Milford responded that it is one of the options.  SPC 4729:299.  When
asked whether she concurred that use of maximum actual emissions be used in increment
analyses was the recommended approach, she responded: “[a]s I said, that’s one of the
options.”  SPC 4729:299.  Milford further stated on cross examination that assuming the
maximum three hour limit for all 31 stacks in the domain for the modeling “would be a rare
occurrence; and that if you feel that that’s a rare occurrence and it’s too extreme, that it
would be permissible to find an area – a level that backs away from that extreme.”  SPC
4729:304.  The record does not contain any follow-up testimony from Milford on what
should be used.  SPC 304-305. 
Finding 12 is supported by the testimony of Heying and Milford who both testified
that the EPA is divided on what constitutes an acceptable approach for which emissions
rates should be used.  SPC 4729: 253-57, 266; 299-302.
8. Finding 13 is Supported by Substantial Evidence
Finding 1311 is not a legal conclusion, but rather the Board’s finding as to what the
12  SPC 4719 (Addendum A).
13  SPC 4719 (Addendum A).
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MOU states.  The finding supports the Board’s Conclusion 4 that “UAC R307-405-4(1)
allows for discretion whether to use maximum actual short term average emission rates or
annual average rates.”  SPC 4718-20.  The MOU states that “[c]onsistent with the [CAA]
and promulgated EPA and North Dakota regulations, the State may use actual emissions as
defined by rule in estimation procedures or short-term periods for all sources.”  SPC 4817. 
Sierra Club does not deny either that the MOU was signed by both North Dakota and the
EPA, or that it contains the language paraphrased in the Board’s finding. 
9. Findings 14 and 15 are Supported by Substantial Evidence
Findings 1412 and 1513 support the Board’s Conclusion 5 that “[t]he Executive
Secretary’s use of long term averages for modeling purposes was protective of the
increment in that it more accurately represented actual air quality than using every source’s
maximum emission rates and was in compliance with existing rules of the Board based on
Findings of Fact, specifically 14 and 15 above.”  SPC 4719-20.  Sierra Club claims that
neither Finding 14 or 15 are supported by the record, yet in a footnote concedes that “Ms.
Heying’s pre-filed testimony marginally supports . . . findings [14 and 15].”  Sierra Club
brief, page 53 n.31.  In support of Finding 14, the Board references Wilkerson’s hearing
testimony as to why using maximum actual three-hour average and 24-hour average SO2
emission rates results in an unrealistically conservative scenario.  SPC 4729:239-42. 
Wilkerson also showed a chart to “visually depict how infrequent these maximum short-
14  SPC 4719 (Addendum A).
53
term rates occur.”  SPC 4729:239; SPC 4884.  Sierra Club’s own expert conceded that
modeling existing sources at their maximum actual three-hour average and 24-hour average
SO2 emission rates would overestimate the impact of those facilities.  SPC 4729:304-05. 
In support of Finding 15, the Board references the pre-filed and hearing testimony of
Heying.  SPC 4719.  On the question of whether the use of annual averages or whether the
use of maximum actual three-hour average and 24-hour average more accurately reflects
actual air quality, Heying testified that “[t]he North Dakota air agency had actual monitored
ambient air quality data that was matching the predictive modeling tools using actual
emissions as input information, but that 90% of the maximum emissions as input into their
analysis over-predicted actual ambient measured air quality in North Dakota.”  SPC 4033. 
Heying’s analyses also found that simultaneous “worst case scenarios” for all of the power
plants in the state of Utah did not actually happen in the years that she examined the data,
and that looking at the printouts of the continuous emissions monitors for the surrounding
facilities that had such data available, there was not one time that the facilities each were
concurrently experiencing maximum allowable emissions.  SPC 4034.
10. Sierra Club Provides No Bases for Challenging Finding 16 
In challenging Finding 16,14 Sierra Club does not challenge the bases for the finding
but rather merely complains that the Board’s finding “ignores that current regulations
require at least three years of meteorology for cumulative Class I increment analysis . . .” 
Sierra Club brief at 56.  Thus, Sierra Club does not dispute Wilkerson’s testimony that only
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one year of meteorological data was required at the time of Sevier Power ’s modeling, or
the Executive Secretary’s explanation of why it required only one year of data.  SPC
4729:242-43; SPC 2497-98.  As Sierra Club does not challenge the bases for Finding 16,
there is nothing for the Court to review.
B. The Board’s Application of the Law to the Facts Was Reasonably and 
Rationally Based
Once it is established that each of the challenged findings of the Board is supported
by substantial evidence, the review changes to the Board’s application of its rule to those
factual findings.  Whether the Board erred in affirming the Executive Secretary’s 
acceptance of annual emission rates in place of three- and 24- hour pollution levels
involves an agency interpreting its rule as promulgated in UAC R307-405-6(2), and is
reviewed for reasonableness and rationality.  To the extent this issue is a mixed question of
law and fact, the findings must be rationally based and set aside only if they are imposed
arbitrarily and capriciously or are beyond the tolerable limits of reason.  
1. Findings in Support of Conclusion that Use of Long Term
Averages are Protective of the Increment are Reasonably and
Rationally Based
Based upon its Findings 14 and 15, the Board rejected Sierra Club’s argument that
using annual emission rates underestimates increment consumption because it does not
account for sources which may emit at higher than annual average rates over a shorter
period of time.  In fact, although Sierra Club’s expert testified that based upon the
modeling, a violation was only a possibility, and Sierra Club presented no evidence that a
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violation would occur.  SPC 3214. Sevier Power’s project modeler Wilkerson testified at
hearing that models are mathematical tools that require accurate input in order to get
reasonable results, and that using prorated annual emission rates gives a more realistic
modeling result.  SPC 4729:236.  Wilkerson testified that models are inherently
conservative and tend to overestimate real world conditions and that given such inherent
conservatisms already in the model, the use of annual emission rates is adequate.  SPC
4729:236-38.  Wilkerson testified Sevier Power  looked at Hunter 1 and 2 emissions and
IPP – Hunter 2 and 3 and IPP 1 and 2 emissions as well as the acid rain database (as did
Milford), and pulled out all the actual hourly emissions.  Sevier Power  found that the
maximum short-term rates for which Sierra Club advocates occur as infrequently as once
every five months.  SPC 4729:238-39.  Wilkerson testified that Sierra Club insists that
these extremely rare high emission rates not only be used for the hour, two, or three of the
year they actually occurred, but they be used every hour of the year, or 8,760 hours.  SPC
4729:240. Then Sierra Club advocates using the extremely rare high emission rates in the
entire domain in the analysis (all 31 stacks).  Wilkerson testified that the odds that all
sources are emitting continuously at their maximum short term rate, every hour of the year
would be mathematically impossible.  SPC 4729:241.  
Heying testified in her prefiled testimony and at hearing about the process that DAQ
undertook to determine which emission rates to use.  SPC 4033-35; SPC 4729: 257, 266-
69, 272-73.  In evaluating the requirement, the Board found it significant that the EPA is
divided on what is an acceptable approach between using maximum actual short-term rates
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and annual average rates, Finding 12, SPC 4718, and that the EPA signed a MOU with the
State of North Dakota stating that the use of annual averages is an acceptable method for
cumulative Class I increment analysis.  Finding 13, SPC 4718.
Sierra Club did not show that the use of short term emission rates is required under
the rule, but rather argued why such rates should be used in order to be protective.  The
Board found it significant that Sierra Club’s own expert acknowledged that the question
was unsettled and that the use of short term averages may be too extreme.  Finding 11, SPC
4718.
The Board reasonably concluded that the regulations allow for the exercise of
discretion in determining whether to use maximum actual short term rates or annual
averages, a point Sierra Club cannot contest.  Finding 11, SPC:4719-20.   Finally, based on
the evidence submitted, the Board reasonably concluded that the “proposed Sevier Power 
installation will not contribute to Class I increment violations at Capitol Reef National Park
. . . .”  Conclusion 7, SPC 4720.
VI: THE BOARD CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PROPERLY INTERPRETED AND COMPLIED WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF UAC R307-401-11
A. The Board’s Interpretation and Application of its 18 Month Review Rule
is Reasonable and Rational
The Board’s interpretation and application of its 18 month review requirement as set
forth in UAC R307-401-11 were reasonably and rationally based.   
The Board found that  “[o]n October 12, 2004 and on April 12, 2006, the applicable
57
rule was UAC R307-401-11.”  Finding 2, SPC 4721.  The Board also found that “40 C.F.R.
§ 52.21(r)  was not incorporated into and effective as part of UAC R307-405-19(1) by the
Board, until June 2006.”  Finding 8, SPC 4721  Based upon Findings 2 and 8, the Board
concluded that ““40 C.F.R. § 52.21(r)  was not applicable to the Sevier Power  permit on
April 12, 2006.”  Conclusion 2, SPC 4722.  Sierra Club does not challenge the above
Findings or Conclusions.  Therefore, Sierra Club’s reference in its brief to “[t]he federal
regulation in place then and now” (“40 C.F.R. § 52.21(r) ), is inapplicable because it did not
apply to the Sevier Power  Approval Order.  
The Board’s Conclusions of Law that Sierra Club appears to challenge are
Conclusion 2 that “UAC R307-401-11 does not require a BACT review at the time of the
18-month review nor does it require a modification of the permit,” SPC 4724, and
Conclusion 3 that “[t]he Executive Secretary properly interpreted and complied with the
requirements of UAC R307-401-11 and Sevier Power  complied with the conditions of the
Approval Order.” SPC 4722
B. Sierra Club’s Stringency Argument is Without Merit
Sierra Club’s stringency argument misapplies the statutory and administrative
provisions of both the CAA and Board’s rules. 
  States have considerable discretion in the creation of their own implementation
plans.  National Steel Corp., Great Lakes Steel Div. v. Gorsuch, 700 F.2d 314, 322 (6th Cir.
1983).  Sierra Club’s application of 42 U.S.C. § 7416 to PSD regulations is misplaced.  42
U.S.C. § 7416 states:
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Except as otherwise provided in sections [42 U.S.C. §]1857c-10(c) , (e), and
(f) (as in effect before August 7, 1977), 7543, 7545(c)(4), and 7573 of this title
(preempting certain State regulation of moving sources) nothing in this chapter
shall preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof to
adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting emissions of air
pollutants or (2) any requirement respecting control or abatement of air
pollution; except that if an emission standard or limitation is in effect under an
applicable implementation plan or under section 7411 or 7412 of this title,
such State or political subdivision may not adopt or enforce any emission
standard or limitation which is less stringent than the standard or limitation
under such plan or section.
42 U.S.C. § 7416.
The New Source Performance Standards (“NSPS”) required by 42 U.S.C.§ 7411,
referenced therein, establish “permissible levels of pollution from new sources.”  U.S. v.
City of Painesville, Ohio, 644 F.2d 1186, 1192 (6th Cir. 1981).   All sources meeting the
definition in 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(2) are subject to NSPS, regardless of whether those
sources are also subject to other requirements, such as the PSD program.  
The uniform standards imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 7416 prevent the race-to-the-bottom
effect that might happen if particular states have less stringent requirements for emissions
from every category of pollution source.  See Id., ( “The new source standards prevent
industries from ‘shopping around’ for ‘pollution havens’ that might otherwise exist if the
states were allowed any flexibility in setting standards for new sources. (cites omitted)  Such
shopping around is foreclosed by the new source standards, because they set a nationwide
‘floor’ on permissible levels of pollution from new sources.”)  
The “emission standard or limitation” referred to in 42 U.S.C. § 7416 relates to NSPS
as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 7411, not to the general requirements for PSD implementation
15 “Attainment Area” is an area meeting the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS).  Sevier County is an attainment area. 
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plans under 42 U.S.C. § 7410, 7470 et seq., 40 C.F.R. § 51.166 , or 40 C.F.R. § 52.21. 
Because the 18 month review provision of UAC R307-401-11 was promulgated pursuant to
the PSD regulations of 40 C.F.R. § 51.166, it is not a NSPS established under 42 U.S.C. §
7411 and its implementing regulations.  As a result, the 18 month review rule does not fall
within the restriction of 42 U.S.C. § 7416 as it relates to Section 7411.  
1. Sierra Club Misapplies 42 U.S.C. § 7416 Which Applies only to
NSPS, Not PSD Permits
  42 U.S.C. § 7411 does not address Sevier Power’s “new source” application.  42
U.S.C. § 7411 governs NSPS for all sources of air pollution, but it is not a permitting
statute.  Instead, because the Sevier Power  facility is to be located in an attainment area,15
Sevier Power’s application for an Approval Order is governed by PSD permitting
regulations under the umbrella of NSR permitting, not by the new source performance
standards of 42 U.S.C. § 7411 and its implementing regulations.  
Because 42 U.S.C. § 7411 addresses only NSPS, EPA did not promulgate 40 C.F.R.
§ 52.21 under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 7411, as Sierra Club contends.  The regulations
promulgated under 42 U.S.C. § 7411 are located at 40 C.F.R. § 60.1 et seq., and address
new sources of air pollution according to their source category, which is not dependent on
the attainment/nonattainment status of the source’s location.  On the other hand, by their
terms both 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.21 and 51.166 implement the CAA’s PSD permitting program
found in 42 U.S.C. § 7470 et seq.  Thus, the PSD provisions of 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 do not
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implement the NSPS provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 7411.  Consequently, Sierra Club’s
contention that 42 U.S.C. § 7411 authorizes the promulgation of 40 C.F.R. § 52.21,
including the eighteen-month BACT review required by 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(r)(2) is incorrect
as a matter of law.  While 42 U.S.C. § 7411 authorizes the promulgation of NSPS
regulations, which in Utah are codified in UAC R307-210, and for states that do not have
approved State Implementation Plans (“SIP”), at 40 C.F.R. § 60.1 et seq.  Utah’s PSD
regulations are codified at UAC R307-401 et seq.  States are allowed to adopt or enforce any
controls on air pollution, as long as the “standard and limitation respecting emissions of air
pollutants” so adopted or enforced is not less stringent than that “in effect under an
applicable implementation plan or under 42 U.S.C. § 7411 or section 7412.  42 U.S.C. §
7416. 
2. Utah’s SIP is EPA-Approved, and Sierra Club Cannot Attack
Approval of a State Plan Through Adjudication of an Approval
Order
Sierra Club’s contention that the state 18 month rule is insufficient as written or as
interpreted by the Board, disregards that Utah’s implementation plan has been approved by
the  EPA.  The EPA’s approval of Utah’s SIP, specifically states that the provisions of 40
C.F.R. § 52.21 apply to sources “to be located on Indian Reservations.”  40 C.F.R. §
52.2346(b).  Sierra Club does not contend that Sevier Power will be located on an Indian
Reservation.  Moreover, the very first subsection of 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 states that the
“provisions of this section are applicable to any State implementation plan [SIP] which as
been disapproved with respect to prevention of significant deterioration [PSD] of air quality
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in any portion of any State where the existing air quality is better than the nation ambient air
quality standards [NAAQS].”  40 C.F.R. § 52.21(a)(1) (emphasis added).  Utah’s PSD plan
has never been disapproved by the EPA, and Sierra Club does not contend otherwise. 
Accordingly, under Utah’s Plan, 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 does not apply outside Indian
Reservations unless specifically incorporated to apply in other circumstances.
Moreover, the “source obligation” provisions of  40 C.F.R.§§ 51.166 (r) and 52.21(r)
differ, and when the Board promulgated UAC R307-401-11 under the authority of 40
C.F.R.§ 51.166, it declined to include an automatic expiration provision or BACT analysis
requirements.  Sierra Club does not claim that the criteria of 40 C.F.R. § 51.166, if followed
by a state and approved by the EPA, would result in a SIP that is insufficiently stringent.  The
EPA approved Utah’s plan developed according to 40 C.F.R. § 51.166, and the approved
plan is the enforceable standard.  
To challenge the adequacy of Utah’s Air Rules, Sierra Club in effect must challenge
the adequacy of the SIP.  To the extent that Sierra Club alleges the inadequacy of the state
18-month review rule, its challenge amounts to an unstated collateral attack on the EPA’s
approval of the SIP, which cannot be accomplished through an adjudication on an Approval
Order.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(5); Clean Air Implementation Project v. EPA, 150 F.3d
1200, 1207 (D.C.Cir. 1998) (EPA-initiated SIP call is exclusive method for requiring a SIP
revision).
In sum, Sierra Club attempts to rely on the catch-all provision of 42 U.S.C. § 7416
without engaging in the necessary detailed analysis of the various statutes and regulations
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that form the basis for Utah’s PSD implementation plan.  Because PSD and NSPS are two
separate and distinct programs under the CAA, Sierra Club’s cross-application of 42 U.S.C. §
7411 to 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(r)(2) in order to subject the Sevier Power 18-month review to the
restrictions of 42 U.S.C.§ 7416 is misplaced and fails as a matter of law.
C. The Board Had Discretion Not to Adopt Application of the Federal Rule 
Since 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(r)(2) was not adopted by the Board until June, 2006, the
Executive Secretary was obligated to apply the 18-month review requirement according to
the plain language of the rule existing at the time.  
1. The Board’s Findings of Fact Support its Conclusions of Law
On the 18 month review, the Board made detailed Findings of Fact in support of its
Conclusions of Law.  In interpreting its rule, the Board concluded that UAC  R307-401-11
does not require a BACT review at the time of the 18-month review nor does it require a
modification of the permit.   Conclusion 2, SPC 4724.  The Board also noted that revocation
of the Approval Order is discretionary.  Conclusion 1, SPC 1.  
Sierra Club attempts to introduce new evidence that the Executive Secretary now
interprets “the same language differently” on another permit.  Sierra Club brief at 61.  Sierra
Club’s Addendum D relating to the IPP Unit 3 Approval Order was never before the Board in
this case and in any event, is dated April 25, 2008 –  three months after the Board issued its
January 9, 2008 order.  Consequently, Sierra Club’s Addendum D constitutes new evidence
on appeal and should be stricken from the record, and all argument in relation thereto should
be ignored.  See UCA § 63-46b-16(4) (“appellate court shall grant relief . . . on the basis of
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the agency’s record . . .”); see also Fuller, 603 P.2d at 817.  Notwithstanding, and in any
event, the 18 month review requirement on the IPP Unit 3 permit is distinguishable.  The
federal rule adopted by the Board and now in effect for the IPP Unit 3 permit was not
applicable to the Sevier Power  permit in April, 2006.
VII. NO CUMULATIVE ERROR
The Board has shown that all of the challenged findings are supported by substantial
evidence and that it has reasonably and rationally applied its rules, rules.  Because Sierra Club
has not demonstrated any error to “undermine the [court’s] confidence . . . that a fair trail[sic]
was had,” the cumulative error doctrine does not apply.  See State v. Havatone, 2008 UT App.
133, ¶ 9, _ P.3d._.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the Board’s findings of fact, which are supported by substantial evidence
and the Board’s reasonable and rational interpretation of its rules and application of the
findings thereto, the Board respectfully requests that the Court affirm the Board’s order dated
January 9, 2008.
Respectfully submitted this _______ day of July, 2008.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS 
BACT Best Available Control Technology
Board Utah Air Quality Board
BTU British Thermal Unit
CAA Clean Air Act
CFB Circulating Fluidized Bed  - Coal Fired Boiler
 CO2 Carbon Dioxide
DAQ Utah Division of Air Quality and/or the Executive Secretary of the Utah Air Quality Board
EAB Environmental Appeals Board
EPA Environmental Protection Agency (United States)
IGCC Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle
IPP Intermountain Power Project
LAER Lowest Achievable Emission Rate
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MMBtu A Thousand Thousand British Thermal Units
NAAQS National Ambient Air Quality Standard
NOI Notice of Intent
NOx Nitrogen Oxide
NO2 Nitrogen Dioxide
NPS National Park Service
NSPS New Source Performance Standards
NSR New Source Review
NSR
Manual
New Source Review Manual
PSD Prevention of Significant Deterioration
RACT Reasonably Available Control Technology
SCR Selective Catalytic Reduction
SIL Significant Impact Levels
SIP State Implementation Plan
SNCR Selective Non-Catalytic Reduction
SO2 Sulfur Dioxide
SPC Sevier Power Company
STATUTORY PROVISIONS:
FEDERAL:
42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(5) (1990) State implementation plans for national primary and
secondary ambient air quality standards
(k) Environmental Protection Agency action on plan submissions
(5) Calls for plan revisions
Whenever the Administrator finds that the applicable implementation plan for any area is
substantially inadequate to attain or maintain the relevant national ambient air quality standard,
to mitigate adequately the interstate pollutant transport described in section 7506a of this title or
section 7511c of this title, or to otherwise comply with any requirement of this chapter, the
Administrator shall require the State to revise the plan as necessary to correct such inadequacies.
The Administrator shall notify the State of the inadequacies, and may establish reasonable
deadlines (not to exceed 18 months after the date of such notice) for the submission of such plan
revisions. Such findings and notice shall be public. Any finding under this paragraph shall, to the
extent the Administrator deems appropriate, subject the State to the requirements of this chapter
to which the State was subject when it developed and submitted the plan for which such finding
was made, except that the Administrator may adjust any dates applicable under such
requirements as appropriate (except that the Administrator may not adjust any attainment date
prescribed under part D of this subchapter, unless such date has elapsed).
42 U.S.C. § 7471 (1990) Plan Requirements
In accordance with the policy of section 7401(b)(1) of this title, each applicable implementation
plan shall contain emission limitations and such other measures as may be necessary, as
determined under regulations promulgated under this part, to prevent significant deterioration of
air quality in each region (or portion thereof) designated pursuant to section 7407 of this title as
attainment or unclassifiable.
42 U.S.C. § 7472(a) (1990) Initial classifications
(a) Areas designated as class I
Upon the enactment of this part, all--
(1) international parks,
(2) national wilderness areas which exceed 5,000 acres in size,
(3) national memorial parks which exceed 5,000 acres in size, and
(4) national parks which exceed six thousand acres in size, and which are in existence on August
7, 1977, shall be class I areas and may not be redesignated. All areas which were redesignated as
class I under regulations promulgated before August 7, 1977, shall be class I areas which may be
redesignated as provided in this part. The extent of the areas designated as Class I under this
section shall conform to any changes in the boundaries of such areas which have occurred
subsequent to August 7, 1977, or which may occur subsequent to November 15, 1990.
(b) Areas designated as class II
All areas in such State designated pursuant to section 7407(d) of this title as attainment or
unclassifiable which are not established as class I under subsection (a) of this section shall be
class II areas unless redesignated under section 7474 of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 7479 (1990) Definitions
(3) The term “best available control technology” means an emission limitation based on the
maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter emitted
from or which results from any major emitting facility, which the permitting authority, on a case-
by-case basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs,
determines is achievable for such facility through application of production processes and
available methods, systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or treatment or
innovative fuel combustion techniques for control of each such pollutant. In no event shall
application of “best available control technology” result in emissions of any pollutants which
will exceed the emissions allowed by any applicable standard established pursuant to section
7411 or 7412 of this title. Emissions from any source utilizing clean fuels, or any other means, to
comply with this paragraph shall not be allowed to increase above levels that would have been
required under this paragraph as it existed prior to November 15, 1990.
STATE:
Utah Code Ann. § 19-2-102 (3) (1995) Definition of Air Pollution
(3) "Air pollution" means the presence in the ambient air of one or more air contaminants in the
quantities and duration and under conditions and circumstances as is or tends to be injurious to
human health or welfare, animal or plant life, or property, or would unreasonably interfere with
the enjoyment of life or use of property, as determined by the rules adopted by the board.
Utah Code Ann. § 19-2-104 (2006) Powers of board
(1) The board may make rules in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act:
(a) regarding the control, abatement, and prevention of air pollution from all sources and the
establishment of the maximum quantity of air contaminants that may be emitted by any air
contaminant source;
(b) establishing air quality standards;
(c) requiring persons engaged in operations which result in air pollution to:
(i) install, maintain, and use emission monitoring devices, as the board finds necessary;
(ii) file periodic reports containing information relating to the rate, period of emission, and
composition of the air contaminant; and
(iii) provide access to records relating to emissions which cause or contribute to air pollution;
(d) implementing 15 U.S.C.A. 2601 et seq. Toxic Substances Control Act, Subchapter II--
Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response, and reviewing and approving asbestos management
plans submitted by local education agencies under that act;
(e) establishing a requirement for a diesel emission opacity inspection and maintenance program
for diesel-powered motor vehicles;
(f) implementing an operating permit program as required by and in conformity with Titles IV
and V of the federal Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990;
(g) establishing requirements for county emissions inspection and maintenance programs after
obtaining agreement from the counties that would be affected by the requirements;
(h) with the approval of the governor, implementing in air quality nonattainment areas employer-
based trip reduction programs applicable to businesses having more than 100 employees at a
single location and applicable to federal, state, and local governments to the extent necessary to
attain and maintain ambient air quality standards consistent with the state implementation plan
and federal requirements under the standards set forth in Subsection (2); and
(i) implementing lead-based paint remediation training, certification, and performance
requirements in accordance with 15 U.S.C.A. 2601 et seq., Toxic Substances Control Act,
Subchapter IV--Lead Exposure Reduction, Sections 402 and 406.
Utah Code Ann. § 19-2-107(g) (1991) Executive secretary--Appointment--Powers
(g) as authorized by the board subject to the provisions of this chapter, enforce rules through the
issuance of orders, including:
(i) prohibiting or abating discharges of wastes affecting ambient air;
(ii) requiring the construction of new control facilities or any parts of new control facilities or the
modification, extension, or alteration of existing control facilities or any parts of new control
facilities; or
(iii) the adoption of other remedial measures to prevent, control, or abate air pollution;
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-3(4)(c) (2001) When rulemaking is required
(4) Rulemaking is not required when:
(a) agency action applies only to internal agency management, inmates or residents of a state
correctional, diagnostic, or detention facility, persons under state legal custody, patients admitted
to a state hospital, members of the state retirement system, or students enrolled in a state
education institution;
(b) a standardized agency manual applies only to internal fiscal or administrative details of
governmental entities supervised under statute;
(c) an agency issues policy or other statements that are advisory, informative, or descriptive, and
do not conform to the requirements of Subsections (2) and (3); or
(d) an agency makes nonsubstantive changes in a rule, except that the agency shall file all
nonsubstantive changes in a rule with the division.
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES:
FEDERAL:
40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(21) (2008) Prevention of significant deterioration of air quality.
(b) Definitions. All State plans shall use the following definitions for the purposes of this
section. Deviations from the following wording will be approved only if the State specifically
demonstrates that the submitted definition is more stringent, or at least as stringent, in all
respects as the corresponding definitions below:
(21)(i) Actual emissions means the actual rate of emissions of a regulated NSR pollutant from an
emissions unit, as determined in accordance with paragraphs (b)(21)(ii) through (iv) of this
section, except that this definition shall not apply for calculating whether a significant emissions
increase has occurred, or for establishing a PAL under paragraph (w) of this section. Instead,
paragraphs (b)(40) and (b)(47) of this section shall apply for those purposes.
(ii) In general, actual emissions as of a particular date shall equal the average rate, in tons per
year, at which the unit actually emitted the pollutant during a consecutive 24-month period
which precedes the particular date and which is representative of normal source operation. The
reviewing authority shall allow the use of a different time period upon a determination that it is
more representative of normal source operation. Actual emissions shall be calculated using the
unit's actual operating hours, production rates, and types of materials processed, stored, or
combusted during the selected time period.
(iii) The reviewing authority may presume that source-specific allowable emissions for the unit
are equivalent to the actual emissions of the unit.
(iv) For any emissions unit that has not begun normal operations on the particular date, actual
emissions shall equal the potential to emit of the unit on that date.
40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (b)(21) (2008) Definition of Actual Emission
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of this section:
(21)(i) Actual emissions means the actual rate of emissions of a regulated NSR pollutant from an
emissions unit, as determined in accordance with paragraphs (b)(21)(ii) through (iv) of this
section, except that this definition shall not apply for calculating whether a significant emissions
increase has occurred, or for establishing a PAL under paragraph (aa) of this section. Instead,
paragraphs (b)(41) and (b)(48) of this section shall apply for those purposes.
(ii) In general, actual emissions as of a particular date shall equal the average rate, in tons per
year, at which the unit actually emitted the pollutant during a consecutive 24-month period
which precedes the particular date and which is representative of normal source operation. The
Administrator shall allow the use of a different time period upon a determination that it is more
representative of normal source operation. Actual emissions shall be calculated using the unit's
actual operating hours, production rates, and types of materials processed, stored, or combusted
during the selected time period.
(iii) The Administrator may presume that source-specific allowable emissions for the unit are
equivalent to the actual emissions of the unit.
(iv) For any emissions unit that has not begun normal operations on the particular date, actual
emissions shall equal the potential to emit of the unit on that date.
40 C.F.R. § 51.166 (r) (2008) State Source obligation.
(r) Source obligation.
(2) The plan shall provide that at such time that a particular source or modification becomes a
major stationary source or major modification solely by virtue of a relaxation in any enforceable
limitation which was established after August 7, 1980, on the capacity of the source or
modification otherwise to emit a pollutant, such as a restriction on hours of operation, then the
requirements of paragraphs (j) through (s) of this section shall apply to the source or
modification as though construction had not yet commenced on the source or modification.
40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (r) (2008) Federal Source Obligation
(r) Source obligation.
(2) Approval to construct shall become invalid if construction is not commenced within 18
months after receipt of such approval, if construction is discontinued for a period of 18 months
or more, or if construction is not completed within a reasonable time. The Administrator may
extend the 18-month period upon a satisfactory showing that an extension is justified. This
provision does not apply to the time period between construction of the approved phases of a
phased construction project; each phase must commence construction within 18 months of the
projected and approved commencement date.
40 C.F.R. § 52.2346 (2003) Significant deterioration of air quality.
(a) The Utah plan, as submitted, is approved as meeting the requirements of Part C, Title I, of the
Clean Air Act, except that it does not apply to sources proposing to construct on Indian Reservations.
(b) Regulation for prevention of significant deterioration of air quality. The provisions of 
§ 52.21 except paragraph (a)(1) are hereby incorporated and made a part of the Utah State
implementation plan and are applicable to proposed major stationary sources or major
modifications to be located on Indian Reservations.
(c) The State of Utah has clarified the generalized language contained in the Utah Air
Conservation Regulations on the use of the "Guidelines on Air Quality Models." In a letter to
Douglas M. Skie, EPA, dated May 26, 1989, F. Burnell Cordner, Director of the Bureau of Air
Quality stated: * * * The language in section 3.7 of the Utah Air Conservation Regulations on
the use of "Guidelines on Air Quality Models" means that all PSD permit reviews will comply
with the use of the "Guideline on Air Quality Models (Revised)", EPA 450/2-78-027R, and any
future supplements approved by EPA.
STATE:
Utah Admin Code R307-101-2 (2005, since amended) Former BACT Definition
"Best available control technology" (BACT)  means an emissions limitation and/or other
controls to include design, equipment, work practice, operation standard or combination therof,
based on the maximum degree or reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under the
Clean Air Act and/or the Utah Air Conservation Act emitted from or which results from any
emitting installation, which the Air Quality Board, on a case-by-case basis taking into account
energy, environmental and economic impacts and other costs, determines is achievable for such
installation through application of production processes and available methods, systems, and
techniques, including fuel cleaning or treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques for
control of each such pollutant. In no event shall applications of BACT result in emissions of any
pollutants which will exceed the emissions allowed by Section 111 or 112 of the Clean Air Act.
UAC R307-401-11 (2005) Former Eighteen Month Review.
Approval orders issued by the executive secretary in accordance with the provisions of R307-
401 will be reviewed eighteen months after the date of issuance to determine the status of
construction, installation, modification, relocation or establishment. If a continuous program of
construction, installation, modification, relocation or establishment is not proceeding, the
executive secretary may revoke the approval order.
UAC R307-405-4(1) (2008) Area Designations.
(1) Pursuant to section 162(a) of the federal Clean Air Act, the following areas are designated as
mandatory Class I areas:
(a) Arches National Park,
(b) Bryce Canyon National Park,
(c) Canyonlands National Park,
(d) Capitol Reef National Park, and
(e) Zion National Park.
UAC R307-405-(6)(2) (2005, since Amended) PSD Areas - New Sources and Modifications.
(2)  Major source and Major Modification Review. Every new major source of major
modification must be reviewed by the Executive Secretary to determine the air quality impact of
the source to include a determination whether the source will cause or contribute to a violation of
the maximum allowable increases or the NAAQS in any area. The determination of air quality
impact will be made as of the source’s projected start up date. Such determination of shall take
into account all allowable emissions of approved sources or modifications whether constructed
or no, and , to the extent practicable, the cumulative effect on air quality of all sources an growth
in the affected area. 
 



















































